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A CRY FOR HELP: AN ARGUMENT FOR ABROGATION
OF THE PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN
CHILD ABUSE AND INCEST CASES
CAROLINE E. JOHNSON
I. INTRODUCTION
R ecently, much attention in this country has focused on children and
their rights. With the candidacy and election of William Jefferson
Clinton as President, Hillary Rodham Clinton's views and ideas, espe-
cially those about children's rights,' have come to the forefront of
American debate.' Hillary Clinton's past association with the Chil-
dren's Defense Fund (CDF) and her friend Marian Wright Edelman's
current leadership of the CDF have brought attention to that organiza-
tion as well. 4
In addition, the Gregory K. case in Florida drew national attention
and sparked national debate as a minor received standing to sue for the
termination of the parental rights of his biological parents . Another
I. Hillary Rodham Clinton has written several articles concerning the rights of children. See
Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HAiv. EDUC. REv. No. 4, 487 (1973); Hillary Rod-
ham, Children's Policies: Abandonment and Neglect, 86 YALE L.J. 1522 (1977) (book review);
Hillary Rodham, Children's Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHhDREN'S RiGHTs: CoNTrEMPoRARY
PSPEcTrvS (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds., 1979). Mrs. Clinton's articles "encourage
the courts to consider children-particularly older adolescents-as legally responsible, reasoning
persons with all of the rights of their parents." Margaret E. Kriz, Political Hot Potato, 24 NAT'L J.
2008 (1992).
2. Divorce, Clinton-Style, NAT'L REV., Oct. 19, 1992, at 18; Kriz, supra note 1; Excerpts:
Ms. Clinton on Kids, NAT'I. L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at 12; The Hand that Rocks the Cradle, NAT'L
REV., May 11, 1992, at 34-35; The Better Half, NAT'L REV., Mar. 30, 1992, at 13; Garry Wills,
H.R. Clinton's Case, N.Y. Rav. BooKs, Mar. 5, 1992, at 3-5.
3. Kriz, supra note 1; Wills, supra note 2, at 4.
4. Kriz, supra note 1, at 2009.
5. LUynn Smith, What's Best for the Children?, L.A. Tmtas, Oct. 18, 1992, at El; Larry
Rohter, To Save or End a Troubled Parent's Rights, N.Y. Taffis, Oct. 4, 1992, § 4, at 1; Gregory's
'Divorce' and Hillary Clinton, STAR TPRi., Sept. 30, 1992, at 16A; Dick Lehr, Child's 'Divorce'
and Family Values, BosToN GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1992, at 3; Anthony DePalma, Custody Decision
Dividing Experts, N.Y. Tnms, Sept. 27, 1992, § 1, at 27; Anthony DePalma, Child's 'Divorce'
Leaves Questions: Flood of Suits Not Expected, Hous. CHtON., Sept. 27, 1992, at A2; Kriz, supra
note 1. Gregory K., a twefve-year-old, alleged that his natural parents abused, abandoned, and
neglected him and that the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services failed to take
appropriate action to protect him. Kriz, supra note 1, at 2008. On July 9, 1992, in a precedential
ruling, a state circuit judge held that Gregory had legal standing to file suit. Boy Wins Separation
From Mother, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEws DIGEsT, Oct. 1, 1992, § F3, at 734 (hereinafter Boy
Wins); Kriz, supra note 1, at 2008; Lehr, supra, at 3. On September 25, 1992, following a two-day
1993]
620 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:617
recent Florida case received less publicity, but had an equal, if not
greater, impact on children's rights. In Richards v. Richards,6 the court
invoked the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity and prevented a mi-
nor child from suing her father for damages resulting from alleged sex-
ual abuse.7 This decision prompted one member of the Florida
Legislature to introduce a bill during the 1993 session that would have
abrogated the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in instances of child
abuse and incest.8 Consequently, the Richards case serves as one of the
most recent decisions illustrating the problem posed by continued ad-
herence to the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity.9
Every state has made child abuse a crime, and every state now has a
mandatory child abuse reporting statute. 0 Many states also allow chil-
dren victimized by abuse to sue their abusive parents." Nevertheless, in
some states, the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity prevents chil-
dren from suing their parents for damages resulting from willful, wan-
ton, malicious, or intentional tortious acts, such as child abuse and
trial, Juvenile Court Judge Thomas S. Kirk terminated the rights of Gregory's natural mother,
Rachel Kingsley, and allowed George and Lizabcth Russ to adopt Gregory, now known as Shawn
Russ. Boy Wins, supra, § F3, at 754; Rohter, supra, § 4, at 1. The Fifth District Court of Appeal
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the
trial court committed reversible error when it entered the adoption order and harmless error when it
allowed Gregory to file the petition in his own name. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 18 Fla. L. Weekly 1852
(Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 18, 1993).
6. 599 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA), review dismissed, 604 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1992).
7. Id. at 136-37; see also Jim Runnels, Court: Kid Can't Sue Dad for Cash, ORLANDO SENwi-
NEL Tum., Apr. 21, 1992, at 1; Jim Runnels, Dad Acquitted on Charges of Child Sex Abuse,
ORANDO SENTINEL TRB., Apr. 9, 1992, at 1.
8. Representative Shirley Brown, Democrat, Sarasota, quoted from the Richards case during
her presentation to the House Judiciary Committee on February 26, 1993, and during debate on the
floor of the Florida House of Representatives on March 18, 1993. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary,
tape recording of proceedings (Feb. 26, 1993) (on file with comm.) (presentation of Rep. Brown);
Fla. H.R., tape recording of proceedings (Mar. 16-18, 1993) (on file with Clerk) (discussion of,
debate on, and final passage of CS for HB 621 and 1211).
9. For purposes of this Comment, as later explained, "parent-child tort immunity" means
unemancipated children cannot bring suit against their parents, and vice versa, for negligent torts
or for willful, wanton, malicious, or intentional torts. Many courts and commentators refer to
parent-child tort immunity as precluding only actions founded on negligence. See, e.g., Glaskox v.
Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906, 907 (Miss. 1992); Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 519 N.E.2d 1299, 1301
(Mass. 1988); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1014 (R.I. 1982); Cynthia J. Atchison, Note, Ard v.
Ard. Limiting the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 44 U. PT. L. REv. 977, 980 (1983). Neverthe-
less, Justice McFarland of the Arizona Supreme Court said it best in proclaiming, "a tort is a tort
is a tort." Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282, 286 (Ariz. 1970) (McFarland, J., dissenting).
10. Julie Solomon Rappaport, The Legal System's Response to Child Abuse: A "Shield" for
Children or a "Sword" Against the Constitutional Rights of Parents?, 9 J. HuM. RTS. 257, 257 n.3
(1991). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (1991); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 273a, 288 (West 1992); N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 260.10 (McKinney 1992).
11. Twenty-nine jurisdictions allow children to sue their parents for damages based on non-
negligent torts, such as child abuse and incest. See infra part IV.A.L.b.(2).
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incest.1 2 Additionally, in many states, parents remain immune from suit
by their unemancipated children for unintentional torts. 3 Similarly,
parents cannot bring suits in tort against their unemancipated minor
children. 14 Nevertheless, children may sue their parents, and vice versa,
once the children become emancipated. 5
This Comment first briefly examines the history of the parent-child
tort immunity doctrine both in the United States and in Florida, as well
as the justifications and rationales behind the doctrine. It then surveys
the current state of the law regarding parent-child immunity in the
United States in general and Florida in particular. The Comment fur-
ther considers the use of the abrogation of interspousal immunity as a
stepping stone to the abrogation of parent-child immunity. Finally,
based on an analysis of action taken by courts and legislatures across
the country and in the State of Florida, the Comment proposes a rea-
sonable response for Florida.
II. HISTORY OF THE PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. General
In contrast to many other legal doctrines, 6 the doctrine of parent-
child tort immunity does not have its origins in the English common
law.' 7 Indeed, at early common law, no tort immunity existed between
12. Richards v. Richards, 599 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA) (minor child could not maintain
lawsuit against father for damages resulting from sexual assaults), review dismissed, 604 So. 2d 487
(Fla. 1992); see also Dubay v. Irish, 542 A.2d 711, 718 n.7 (Conn. 1988) (suggesting that immunity
may bar actions based on a parent's willful, wanton, or reckless conduct).
13. See, e.g., Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418, 427-28 (W. Va. 1991); Jenkins v. Sno-
homish County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 713 P.2d 79, 83 (Wash. 1986); Lee v. Mowett Sales Co.,
342 S.E.2d 882, 883-86 (N.C. 1986); Irish, 542 A.2d at 714; Carpenter v. Bishop, 720 S.W.2d 299,
300 (Ark. 1986); Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826, 832-38 (Md. 1986).
14. The doctrine of parent-child tort immunity bars actions by parents against their children
as well as actions by children against their parents. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROssER AND KEErON
ON Tim LAw oF Tosrs § 122, at 904 (5th ed. 1984).
15. "Emancipation" means "entire surrender of the right to the care, custody, and earnings
of [a] child, as well as renunciation of parental duties." BLACK'S LAw DicnoN.ARY 521 (6th ed.
1990). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing emancipation. See Fiori v. McFadden, 405 So. 2d
737, 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (parent-child tort immunity does not extend to suit by mother against
married daughter and the daughter's husband for injuries sustained during an extended visit to
daughter's home), petition denied, 415 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1982). In its 1992 session, the Florida
Legislature extended the statute of limitations for actions by adult children of abusive parents. Fla.
HB 703 (1992) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 95.11(7) (Supp. 1992)).
16. For example, the interspousal tort immunity doctrine.
17. KEETON, supra note 14, § 122; Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135, 136 (Kan. 1980);
see Michael A. Young, A Job Half-Done: Florida's Judicial Modification of the Intrafamilial Tort
Immunities, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 639, 641-42 (1983). For a discussion of the early English law,
see William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAzv. L. REv. 1030,
1031-50 (1930).
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parents and their children."5 Further, English and American courts con-
sistently permitted suits between parents and children involving prop-
erty and contract rights.' 9 Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons,
American courts adopted the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity,
thereby barring actions in tort between parents and their children.
The parent-child tort immunity doctrine began over one hundred
years ago with the Mississippi Supreme Court decision of Hewellette v.
George.2° In Hewellette, a young married woman, separated from her
husband, sued her mother's estate for damages resulting from an al-
leged false imprisonment." The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to
allow the daughter, deemed an unemancipated minor, to bring the ac-
tion." As the court explained in a frequently quoted passage,
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and
the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear
in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through its criminal
laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and
wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand. 23
Thus, noting that the criminal law provided the only recourse for a mi-
nor child, the court barred the suit. 24 Significantly, the court cited no
authority in support of this holding, relying instead on its own view of
public policy. 25
In McKelvey v. McKelvey, 26 the second case in "the great trilogy' 27
of parent-child tort immunity cases, the Tennessee Supreme Court fol-
18. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 136; Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007,
1009 (Haw. 1969) (as amended in 1970); KEEToN, supra note 14, § 122, at 904.
19. Petersen, 462 P.2d at 1009; Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 909 (Mass. 1975);
Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Wis. 1963).
20. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891), modified by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992)
(adopting motor vehicle exception to parent-child tort immunity). A discrepancy exists concerning
the spelling of "Hewellette." See Atchison, supra note 9, at 978 n.5. West's Reporter cites the case
as Hewellette v. George, but many courts and commentators cite it as Hewlett v. George. This
Comment will cite the case as "Hewellette."
21. The daughter claimed her mother had committed her to an insane asylum against her will.
Hewellette, 9 So. at 887.
22. Id. The court found the daughter "unemancipated" even though she was married be-
cause, according to the court, the parent-child bond remained intact at the time of the incident. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Haw. 1970); Nockton-
ick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135, 137 (Kan. 1980).
26. 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
27. Edwin D. Akers & William H. Drummond, Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of
the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 182 (1961).
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lowed Mississippi's lead and recognized the doctrine. 2S The court held
that parent-child immunity prevented a minor from suing her father
and stepmother for damages resulting from allegedly "cruel and inhu-
man treatment."2 9 Citing Hewellette, the McKelvey court reasoned that
judicial interference in the area of parental control and discipline would
contravene public policy."' In addition, as did the Hewellette court, the
court in McKelvey believed that minor children injured by the actions
of their parents had no redress other than through the criminal law.3
Finally, in Roller v. Roller,32 the Supreme Court of Washington re-
fused to allow a minor child to sue her father for damages after he was
convicted of raping her.3 While acknowledging some merit in the plain-
tiff's argument that the family's relationship had already been dis-
rupted, the court nevertheless reasoned:
[11f it be once established that a child has a right to sue a parent for a
tort, there is no practical line of demarkation which can be drawn, for
the same principle which would allow the action in the case of a
heinous crime, like the one involved in this case, would allow an
action to be brought for any other tort. The principle permitting the
action would be the same. The torts would be different only in degree.
Hence all the disturbing confusion would be introduced which can be
imagined under a system which would allow parents and children to be
involved in litigation of this kind 4
Citing Hewellette along with numerous public policy reasons,35 the
Roller court adopted the doctrine and barred the action.36
28. McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 665.
29. Id. at 664.
30. Id. at 664-65.
31. Id. at 664.
32. 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905), modified by Borst v. Borst, 251 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1952) (abolish-
ing parent-child tort immunity in claims arising out of a nonparental transaction).
33. Id. at 789. The plaintiff daughter had prevailed in the lower court and received a judg-
ment of $2,000 in damages. Id. at 788.
34. Id. at 789. Perhaps now this same court would hold otherwise in light of the "disturbing
confusion" that has developed in the construction of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine since
its inception. See State Survey Section infra part IV. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Washington
later recognized the absurdity inherent in the Roller decision:
The third case in the great trilogy carries the doctrine of the sacredness of the family unit
to the most absurd degree yet. [In Roller,] this court held that the incestuous rape of a
15-year-old child could not be the subject of a compensation action because to allow
such suit would destroy the family relationship. How unreal.
Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610 P.2d 891, 892 (Wash. 1980) (en banc).
35. Roller, 79 P. at 789. The public policy reasons are discussed in the Justifications section
infra part III.
36. Roller, 79 P. at 789.
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Thus, Hewellette, McKelvey, and Roller established the foundation
for the parent-child tort immunity doctrine that was eventually adopted
in forty-four states.37 Although all three cases involved intentional torts,
as the doctrine gained acceptance around the country, courts applied
the immunity in negligence cases as well. 8
B. Florida
In Meehan v. Meehan,9 a Florida court first recognized the general
parent-child tort immunity doctrine established by the Hewellette,
MeKelvey, and Roller decisions.40 In Meehan, a father sued one of his
minor sons for negligence in inflicting injuries that caused the death of
another minor son. 4' The Second District Court of Appeal, following
the majority view at the time, held that public policy demanded the
dismissal of the suit.42 Six years later, the same court heard the case of
Rickard v. Rickard.43 In Rickard, a minor child sued his parents,
37. Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135, 137 (Kan. 1980); Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d
416, 417 (D.C. 1987). Six states and the District of Columbia have never adopted the doctrine:
Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont. Infra Appendix accompany-
ing note 299. For a detailed discussion of the states' positions, see the State Survey section infra
part IV.
38. KEEToN, supra note 14, § 122, at 904; see also Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 650 (Cal.
1971) ("states quickly adopted the rule of Hewlett and Roller, applying it to actions for negligence
as well as for intentional torts, occasionally with more emotion than reason"); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461
A.2d 1145, 1147 (N.J. 1983) ("[n]umerous states ... adopted the doctrine of parent-child immu-
nity and applied it to both negligent and intentional torts"). Most jurisdictions in the United States
"adopted the doctrine of parental immunity, holding that an unemancipated minor child may not
maintain an action in tort against a parent to recover damages for personal injuries." Nocktonick,
611 P.2d at 137.
39. 133 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
40. Id. at 777-78. An earlier Florida case allowed a minor child to sue his father for the
wrongful death of his mother. Henderson v. Henderson, 14 Fla. Supp. 181 (Fla. Escambia County
Ct. 1958). Notably, the Henderson court elected not to follow the Hewellette line of cases, deciding
instead that the line of cases led by Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905 (N.H. 1930), served as the
"correct ones for a court in this enlightened age to follow .... " Henderson, 14 Fla. Supp. at 184.
Concluding that "it was never intended that such doctrine should become a protective cloak, under
civil law, for willful and wanton offenses," the Henderson court held that the parent-child tort
immunity doctrine should not bar an action arising from a wanton, willful, or intentional act,
"particularly where such act is alleged to have been committed outside the relation of parent and
child ...." Id. Nevertheless, perhaps due to the underlying action involved in Henderson, the case
has not been followed or cited by other Florida courts considering the doctrine. See Ard v. Ard,
414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
41. Meehan, 133 So. 2d at 777. As previously mentioned, the doctrine of parent-child immu-
nity is reciprocal, preventing suits by children against their parents as well as suits by parents
against their children. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
42. Meehan, 133 So. 2d at 777. As the court reasoned, "on this questiorr of public policy the
law of Florida should be that of the majority of the states." Id. at 778. Apparently, the court is not
following this same rationale today. See infra part IV A.2.
43. 203 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).
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through his father as his next friend, for damages resulting from their
alleged negligence in providing an unsafe place for him to play." The
court, following Meehan, refused to allow the action.45 Another district
court considered the issue of parent-child tort immunity in Denault v.
Denault.46 In Denauft, a minor child sued her mother for injuries result-
ing from an automobile accident caused by her mother's negligence. 47
Relying on Meehan and Rickard, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reasoned that "the issue has been previously determined in Florida and
we are in nowise persuaded that Florida's rule is wrong or that it should
be abrogated. "41
In 1970, in Orefice v. Albert,49 the Supreme Court of Florida consid-
ered the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity for the first time. 0 Or-
efice also involved the interspousal tort immunity doctrine. A woman,
on behalf of herself and her son's estate, brought suit against a co-
owner of the plane in which her minor son was killed as a result of the
negligence of her husband, the child's father, who was also a co-owner
of the plane."' As the supreme court explained, "It is established policy,
evidenced by many decisions, that suits will not be allowed in this state
among members of a family unit for tort. Spouses may not sue each
other, nor children their parents. The purpose of this policy is to pro-
tect family harmony and resources.' '52 Thus, citing public policy rea-
sons, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the
suit.53
Relying on Orefice, in 1972, the Third District Court of Appeal de-
cided Webb v. Allstate Insurance Co.54 As in Denault, the Webb court
refused to allow a minor child to sue his father for damages resulting
from his father's negligence in operating a motor vehicle." Later that
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id. at 8. As the court explained, "We see no reason why the rule should not be the same
where a minor child, acting through his natural parent, seeks to sue his parents for damages for
their alleged negligence in not properly protecting the person of the minor child." Id.
46. 220 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).
47. Id. at 27.
48. Id. Despite this enlightening rationale, the Florida Supreme Court subsequently abrogated
the immunity doctrine in negligence actions, including those arising out of motor vehicle accidents,
to the extent of available liability insurance coverage. Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1070 (Fla.
1982). For a more detailed discussion, see infra part IV.A.2.a.
49. 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
50. Id. at 146.
51. Id. at 143. Her husband also died in the crash. Id.
52. Id. at 145. Evidently, the supreme court followed the rationale of the Denault decision.
See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
53. Orefice, 237 So. 2d at 146.
54. 258 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
55. Id. at 841.
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same year, in Vinci v. Gensler,6 the Second District invoked Orefice
and Webb to prevent the estates of two minor children from bringing
suit against their father's estate.17 A dissenting opinion by Judge Liles,
however, identified many discrepancies in the justifications underlying
the doctrine. Nevertheless, with this foundation of cases, the Florida
courts established the structure of parent-child immunity in the state. 9
III. BASIC JUSTIFICATIONS UNDERLYING THE PARENT-CHILD TORT
IMMuNrrY DOCTRINE
In addition to the history of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine,
an examination of its underlying justifications aids in understanding its
current ramifications. Courts have used some or all of the following
public policy concerns to establish and uphold the doctrine:
(1) protection of the family unit and family harmony; 60
(2) prevention of interference with parental care, discipline, and con-
trol;6
1
(3) prevention of fraud or collusion, particularly in cases involving
insurance;62
56. 269 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
57. Id. at 20.
58. Id. at 20-22 (Liles, I., dissenting). Judge Liles also advocated treating parent-child immu-
nity similarly to interspousal immunity. Id.
59. Other pre-Ard Florida cases involving the parent-child tort immunity doctrine include the
following: Fiori v. McFadden, 405 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (on rehearing) (mother allowed
to sue married daughter and daughter's husband for injuries sustained during visit to their home);
Quest v. Joseph, 392 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (action for contribution may be maintained
against parent of injured minor plaintiff even though child may not sue parent and parent's liability
involves negligent supervision), modified, 414 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1982) (limited contribution against
parent to the extent of parent's existing liability insurance coverage); Horton v. Unigard Ins. Co.,
355 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (immunity precluded wrongful death action by minor children
against father who drove motor vehicle in accident killing mother), cert. dismissed, 373 So. 2d 459
(Fla. 1979); Torres v. Allstate Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (parent cannot sue child
for tort committed during child's minority); Mieure v. Moore, 330 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
(children may not sue parents in tort); Wright v. Farmers' Reliance Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 641 (Fla.
3d DCA 1975) (father cannot sue minor son for injuries sustained by another minor son as a result
of the first son's negligence). For other discussions of the early cases in Florida, see Young, supra
note 17 and W. Roderick Bowdoin, Comment, Parental Immunity: The Case for Abrogation of
Parental Immunity in florida, 25 U. FLA. L. Rav. 794 (1973).
60. Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 1982); Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255, 256
(Iowa 1983); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135, 137 (Kan. 1980); Hewellette v. George, 9
So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891), modified by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992) (adopting
motor vehicle exception); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788, 788-89 (Wash. 1905), modified by Borst v.
Borst, 251 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1952) (abolishing parental tort immunity in claims arising out of non-
parental transactions).
61. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1068; Wagner, 340 N.W.2d at 256; Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 137;
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664, 665 (Tenn. 1903).
62. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1068; Wagner, 340 N.W.2d at 256; Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 137.
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(4) prevention of depletion of the family funds in favor of the claim-
ant at other family members' expense;6 3
(5) prevention of inheritance by the tortfeasor of any damages
awarded because of the tortfeasor's actions;6 and
(6) analogy to the interspousal immunity doctrine.65
The first and most frequently offered justification for the parent-
child immunity doctrine is the protection of family harmony.6 Many
courts reason that the doctrine is "necessary for the protection of fam-
ily peace and tranquility, and that any change in the rule would inter-
fere with the rights and obligations of parents with respect to the
discipline, control, and care of their children.''67 Thus, these courts
conclude, leaving torts uncompensated contributes to family harmony
and respect for parents.6e
A second justification is that allowing such suits would pose a threat
to parental authority and discretion. If children could sue their parents,
the action would call into question parents' authority and discretion to
care for, discipline, and control their children. 69 This justification rec-
ognizes that, in light of the unique nature of the parent-child relation-
ship, parents should have the ability and authority to spank or
otherwise punish their children without risking liability: "Obviously, a
parent may exercise certain authority over a minor child which would
be tortious if directed toward someone else." 70
A third justification is that allowing children to sue their parents
would encourage collusion and fraud, especially when liability insur-
ance is involved. 7' The thrust of this concern is the fear that family
members will conspire to defraud an insurance company. Thus, "[t]he
collusion argument assumes that the suit is in reality aimed not at the
defendant family member but at his insurance carrier.' '7
63. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1068; Wagner, 340 N.W.2d at 256; Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 137;
Roller, 79 P. at 789.
64. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1068; Wagner, 340 N.W.2d at 256; Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 137;
Roller, 79 P. at 789.
65. Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 417 (D.C. 1987); Wagner, 340 N.W.2d at 256; Mc-
Kelvey, 77 S.W. at 665; Roller, 79 P. at 788-89. This justification is discussed in more detail in the
Interspousal Immunity section infra part V.
66. Nocklonick, 611 P.2d at 137; Rousey, 528 A.2d at 417. Many courts and commentators
reject this rationale, reasoning that "no greater disruption of family harmony is caused by a suit
pitting a child against a parent than a suit pitting brother against sister or husband against wife
which is allowed." Thomas v. Inmon, 594 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Ark. 1980) (Mays, J., dissenting).
67. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child
Caused by Parent's Negligence-Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066, 1072 (1981).
68. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 418.
69. Id.
70. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 652 (Cal. 1971).
71. Eclavea, supra note 67, at 1072.
72. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 652.
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A fourth justification for the immunity doctrine is that allowing chil-
dren to sue their parents would "result in the injured child's taking the
assets of the family, required to support the entire family unit, to him-
self, thus rendering the family destitute. ' 73 The concern is that unless
insurance is available, an award of damages will reduce the amount of
funds available to the family as a unit.
A fifth justification is that the parent may inherit the damages
awarded to the child as a result of the parent's actions. This argument,
implementing the public policy of preventing tortfeasors from benefit-
ting from their torts, prepares for the contingency that the child will die
before the parent.74
Thus, in upholding the doctrine, courts have relied on a number of
justifications. Most courts, however, have abrogated the doctrine in
certain situations where the underlying justifications no longer support
its application.
IV. A SURVEY OF THE STATES: To ABROGATE OR NOT TO ABROGATE
Dissatisfaction with the justifications and the consequences of apply-
ing parent-child tort immunity gave rise to numerous exceptions to the
doctrine. 7" Indeed, very few jurisdictions retain the immunity in its orig-
inal form, and generalizing about the current status of the doctrine
proves difficult.16 Nonetheless, this Comment divides into categories ac-
tions taken by the states concerning parent-child tort immunity. 77 The
first major division separates judicial action from legislative action.
Such a division is appropriate and illustrative for two reasons. First,
because the doctrine was judicially created, 7 many courts have freely
created exceptions to the doctrine, 79 reasoning that they, as opposed to
73. Eclavea, supra note 67, at 1072.
74. Nonetheless, as most courts and commentators point out, prevention of inheritance by a
parent tortfeasor does not justify depriving an injured child of a cause of action because of the
remote possibility that the child might predecease the parent. Prohibiting the inheritance, rather
than immunizing the tortfeasor, would probably be a better approach. Gail D. Hollister, Parent-
Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FoRDHA.ma L. REv. 489, 497-98 (1982).
75. See Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 419 (D.C. 1987).
76. Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145, 1147-48 (N.J. 1983); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656
P.2d 820, 823 (Mont. 1983). Only Tennessee retains the doctrine in its original form. See infra part
IV.A.I.a. As Justice Smith of the Illinois Appellate Court explained, the doctrine "has undergone
a general erosion like the all-day sucker in the hands of a small child until there isn't much left but
the stick itself." Schenk v. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
77. Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Drowota made an excellent point relating to categoriza-
tion of action taken by states: "Other jurisdictions have dealt with parental immunity in many
different ways which makes classification of these different rulings difficult." Barranco v. Jackson,
690 S.W.2d 221, 226 (Tenn. 1985) (Drowota, J., dissenting).
78. See History of the Parent-Child Tort Immunity Doctrine section infra part 1I.
79. See Partial Immunity section supra part IV.A. 1.b.
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the legislative branch, have the "primary responsibility to restrict its
application when it produces undesirable results. "80 Second, at least
four courts, including a Florida court, have refused to abrogate the
doctrine in the absence of legislative action." This Comment makes fur-
ther divisions within the judicial and legislative categories according to
the extent of the doctrine's application, distinguishing among jurisdic-




Only one state has judicially adopted and continues to retain the par-
ent-child immunity doctrine in its original form.8 2 The Tennessee Su-
preme Court, one of the first courts to recognize the doctrine, has
refused to abrogate the immunity established in that state by the Mc-
Kelvey decision. 83 Indeed, in Barranco v. Jackson,8 the Tennessee Su-
preme Court refused to modify or abolish the doctrine, reasoning that
"the rule announced in McKelvey has continuing vitality and should be
80. Barranco, 690 S.W.2d at 225 (Drowota, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme
Court decided that despite the Legislature's abrogation of the immunity in motor vehicle accident
cases, no indication existed "that this judicially created doctrine should be excluded from modifica-
tion through the processes that normally refashion judge-made law." Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 512
A.2d 130, 136 (Conn. 1986).
81. Richards v. Richards, 599 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA), review dismissed, 604 So. 2d
487 (Fla. 1992); Barranco, 690 S.W.2d at 222 (doctrine "has continuing vitality and should be
adhered to unless modified or changed by action of the [Tennessee] General Assembly"); Lee v.
Mowett Sales Co., 342 S.E.2d 882, 886 (N.C. 1986); Hill v. Giordano, 447 So. 2d 164 (Ala. 1984).
Since the passage of a statute abrogating the immunity for actions arising out of motor vehicle
accidents, North Carolina courts have refused to abolish what remains of the doctrine in that state
because to do so "after the legislature has considered and retained the doctrine would be to engage
in impermissible judicial legislation." Lee, 342 S.E.2d at 885. But see Doe v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511,
513 (N.C. 1992) (doctrine does not apply to willful and malicious acts). With the exception of
sexual abuse cases, the Alabama Supreme Court has also refused to abrogate the doctrine, "flleing
of the opinion that any modification or abolition of the parental immunity doctrine should be left
to the prerogative of the legislature .... " Hill v. Giordano, 447 So. 2d 164 (Ala. 1984); Hurst v.
Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1989) (sexual abuse exception).
82. Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. 1985). Louisiana also retains the immunity,
but in statute form. LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 9:571 (West 1992). See Legislative Action section infra
part IV.B,
83. Barranco, 690 S.W.2d at 222; Campbell v. Gruttemeyer, 432 S.W.2d 894, 900 (Tenn.
1968). McKelvey is reported at McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
84. 690S.W.2dat221.
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adhered to unless modified or changed by action of the [Tennessee]
General Assembly."8 5 Thus, only one of the three states that originally
provided the foundation for the parent-child tort immunity doctrine
continues to uphold and apply the immunity almost without excep-
tion. 6
b. Partial Immunity 7
Most states have established exceptions to the parent-child tort im-
munity doctrine, restricting its scope where the underlying rationales no
longer justify its application.8 These exceptions include the following
situations:
85. Id. at 222.
86. But see Brown v. Selby, 322 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1960). In Brown, the court allowed minor
children to bring a wrongful death action against their father for causing the death of their mother.
The court explained that the mother had divorced the father prior to her death and that had she
survived, she would have been able to bring an action against the father. Id. at 168. Thus, due to
the extraordinary circumstances of the. case, the court allowed the children to bring the action
against their father on behalf of their mother. Id. The court reasoned that because the right of
action was that of the mother, rather than the children, the parent-child tort immunity doctrine did
not apply. Id. at 168-69.
87. This category of states, for the purpose of this Comment, includes states that, for one
reason or another, have abrogated the doctrine for injuries caused by a parent's negligence but not
for injuries caused by a parent's nonnegligent acts. It also includes the states that have abrogated
the doctrine for injuries caused by nonnegligent acts but not for those caused by negligent acts. In
addition, courts in some states have rendered decisions abrogating the doctrine for negligent torts
without addressing the issue of nonnegligent torts. Consequently, the states failing to address the
issue of nonnegligent torts have been included in this section, although in reality, courts in these
states may not necessarily invoke the doctrine for nonnegligent acts.
88. Courts in 33 states have established exceptions to the parent-child tort immunity doctrine.
Alabama: Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1989); Alaska: Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8
(Alaska 1967); Arizona: Sandoval v. Sandoval, 623 P.2d 800 (Ariz. 1981); Streenz v. Streenz, 471
P.2d 28Z (Ariz. 1970); Arkansas: Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 633 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1982);
Colorado: Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 1385 (Colo. 1990); Delaware: Williams v. Wl-
liams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976); Florida: Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Georgia: Wright
v. Wright, 70 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952); Idaho: Farmers Ins. Group v. Reed, 712 P.2d 550
(Idaho 1985); Illinois: Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (ill. 1956); Cates v. Cates, 588 N.E.2d
330 (111. App. Ct. 1992), aff'd, 619 N.E.2d 715 (1993); Indiana: Barnes v. Barnes, 603 N.E.2d 1337
(Ind. 1992); Iowa: Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981); Kansas: Nocktonick v. Nock-
tonick, 611 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980); Kentucky: Horn v. Horn, 630 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1982); Rigdon v.
Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970); Maine: Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979); Maryland:
Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923 (Md. 1951); Massachusetts: Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 519 N.E.2d
1299 (Mass. 1988); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Michigan: Plumley v.
Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972); Mississippi: Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992);
Missouri: Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991); Montana: Transamerica Ins. Co. v.
Royle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1983); Nebraska: Pulen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16 (Neb. 1959); New
Jersey: Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1983); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 267 A.2d
490 (N.J. 1970); North Carolina: Doe v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1992); Oklahoma: Unah v.
Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984); Rhode Island: Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982);
Texas: Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex.
19931 PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY
(1) the injury resulted from conduct other than simple negligence; 9
(2) the injury arises out of a motor vehicle accident caused by the
parent's negligence;90
(3) the parent has liability insurance; 9'
(4) the injury arises because the parent has assumed a nonparental
role, such as the role of an employer; 92
(5) the defendant is not the natural parent; 93
(6) death has dissolved the family unit;9 and
(7) the child is emancipated. 9
Thus, for the most part, the exceptions apply to situations where the
parent-child relationship effectively no longer exists or where the con-
duct of the parent does not occur in the context of a family relation-
ship.9 Finally, because most states have established exceptions in the
last four situations, this Comment focuses primarily on the first three
exceptions. 97
(1) Negligent Torts
Courts in twenty-six states have, in some fashion, abrogated parent-
child tort immunity for negligent torts.98 Most states have abrogated the
1971); Utah: Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Virginia: Smith v. Kauffman, 183
S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971); Washington: Jenkins v. Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 713
P.2d 79 (Wash. 1986); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610 P.2d 891 (Wash. 1980); West Virginia: Courtney v.
Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1991); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976); Wisconsin:
Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963); Wyoming: Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153
(Wyo. 1992); Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971); see also CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572c
(1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1992); Legislative Action section infra part IV.B.
89. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 138; Hill v. Giordano, 447 So. 2d 164, 165 (Ala. 1984) (when a
parent intentionally harms a child, the parent has "step[ped] out of the bounds of parental capac-
ity").
90. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 138.
91. Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1070 (Fla. 1982); Hill, 447 So. 2d at 165.
92. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 138; see Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex.
1971); see also Hill, 447 So. 2d at 165 (businesses usually have liability insurance and "it is essen-
tially irrelevant that the injured person is a child of the insured").
93. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 138 ("When there is bodily harm inflicted by a stepfather, a
grandparent, or a teacher looking after the child, there is no immunity.").
94. Id.; Hill, 447 So. 2d at 165; Dean v. Smith, 211 A.2d 410 (N.H. 1965).
95. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 138; see Lancaster v. Lancaster, 57 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1952);
Wood v. Wood, 63 A.2d 586 (Conn. 1948). Most courts agree the doctrine does not apply to
emancipated children, as the justifications for the immunity no longer exist when the child leaveg
home. Hill, 447 So. 2d 164, 165 (Ala. 1984); see KEETON, supra note 14, § 122, at 906.
96. Hill, 447 So. 2d at 165.
97. Although most jurisdictions have also abrogated the doctrine in motor vehicle cases, dis-
cussion of these cases is relevant because of the reliance of those jurisdictions on the presence of
liability insurance and its negation of some of the justifications underlying application of the par-
ent-child tort immunity doctrine.
98. Alaska: Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Arizona: Sandoval v. Sandoval, 623
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doctrine to permit actions for damages arising out of motor vehicle ac-
cidents. Some states also have abrogated the doctrine for all negligent
torts with the exception of two situations, following the approach es-
tablished by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Goller v. White.99
(a) Motor Vehicle Accidents
In cases involving parental negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle, a trend has developed toward the abrogation of the immunity
doctrine.I°° The main factor these courts rely on to justify the abroga-
P.2d 800 (Ariz. 1981); Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970); Delaware: Williams v. Wil-
liams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976); Florida: Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Idaho: Farmers
Ins. Group v. Reed, 712 P.2d 550 (Idaho 1985); Illinois: Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (11.
1956); Cates v. Cates, 588 N.E.2d 330 (111. App. Ct. 1992), aff'd, No. 73630, 1993 WL 323109 (11.
Aug. 26, 1993); Iowa: Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981); Kansas: Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980); Kentucky: Horn v. Horn, 630 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1982); Rig-
don v. Rigdon. 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970); Maine: Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979);
Massachusetts: Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 519 N.E.2d 1299 (Mass. 1988); Sorensen v. Sorensen,
339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Michigan: Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972); Missis-
sippi: Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992); Missouri: Hartman v. Hartman, 821
S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991); Montana: Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1983);
New Jersey: Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1983); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 267
A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970); North Carolina: Doe v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1992); Oklahoma: Unah
v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984); Rhode Island: Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982);
Texas: Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex.
1971); Virginia: Smith v. Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971); Washington: Jenkins v. Snohom-
ish County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 713 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1986); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610 P.2d 891
(Wash. 1980); West Virginia: Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1991); Lee v. Comer,
224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976); Wisconsin: Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963); Wyom-
ing: Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (Wyo. 1992); Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo.
1971); CoNiN. GEN. STAr. § 52-572c (1993); N.C. GENc. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1992).
99. 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
100. Courts in 29 states have refused to apply the immunity in actions for damages caused by
the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See Alaska: Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967);
Arizona: Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970); Delaware: Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d
669 (Del. 1976); Florida: Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Illinois: Cates v. Cates, 588
N.E.2d 330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), aff'd, No. 73630, 1993 WL 323109 (111. Aug. 26, 1993); Iowa:
Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981); Kansas: Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135
(Kan. 1980); Kentucky: Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970); Maine: Black v. Solmitz,
409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979); Massachusetts: Sorenson v. Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975);
Michigan: Sweeney v. Sweeney, 262 N.W.2d 625 (Mich. 1978); Minnesota: Silesky v. Kelman, 161
N.W.2d 631 (Minn. 1968), overruled by Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) (over-
ruling Silesky in favor of total abrogation of immunity); Mississippi: Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So.
2d 906 (Miss. 1992); Montana: Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1983); Nev-
ada: Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974); New Hampshire: Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588
(N.H. 1966); New Jersey: France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970); New York:
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969); North Carolina: Carver v. Carver, 314 S.E.2d
739 (N.C. 1984); North Dakota: Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Oklahoma: Unah
v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984); Oregon: Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984); Pennsyl-
vania: Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971); Rhode Island: Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I.
1982); Vermont: Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191 (Vt. 1977); Virginia: Wright v. Wright, 191 S.E.2d
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tion of the doctrine in this situation is the prevalence of automobile
liability insurance.' 0' Indeed, "[w]hile courts concede that the existence
of automobile insurance cannot create liability where none existed be-
fore, the prevalence of liability insurance has been held to be a proper
factor to consider in determining the applicability of parental immu-
nity.'"0
Moreover, these courts explain that the presence of insurance negates
some of the justifications traditionally cited in support of the doctrine.
For example, as the Arizona Supreme Court reasoned, "Where such
insurance exists, the domestic tranquility argument is hollow, for in re-
ality the sought after litigation is not between child and parent but be-
tween child and parent's insurance carrier."'' 3 In addition, "[flar from
being a potential source of disharmony, the action is more likely to
preserve the family unit in pursuit of a common goal-the easing of
family financial difficulties stemming from the child t s injuries. ' ' 04
Thus, the courts conclude, the existence of liability insurance prevents
family discord and the depletion of family assets, thereby negating two
of the public policy reasons justifying application of the doctrine. 105
Further, in these cases, courts reason that the doctrine's remaining
rationales do not support barring the action. These courts dismiss the
fraud and collusion argument. 106 Recognizing that this danger exists in
any action, the courts do not believe it justifies the denial of meritori-
ous claims.'0 As the courts reason, insurance company investigators,
juries, and judges filter the facts, separating the frivolous claims from
the substantial ones and the fraudulent claims from the meritorious
223 (Va. 1972); Washington: Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610 P.2d 891 (Wash. 1980); West Virginia: Lee
v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976); Wyoming: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Ins. Dept., 672
P.2d 810 (Wyo. 1983); see also CONN. GEN. STAr. § 52-572c (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21
(1992), discussed infra part IV.B. I .b.
101. Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906, 911 (Miss. 1992); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle,
656 P.2d 820, 823 (Mont. 1983); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Okla. 1984); Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135, 138-39 (Kan. 1980); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 723 (W. Va. 1976).
All states mandate automobile insurance coverage. Florida has abrogated the doctrine on a broader
scope, allowing actions between parents and children whenever liability insurance is present. Ard v.
Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982). See infra part IV.A.2.a.
102. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 138-39.
103. Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 292, 284 (Ariz. 1970).
104. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (Mass. 1975); Unah, 676 P.2d at 1370.
105. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d at 914; Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906, 911 (Miss. 1992);
Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (N.H. 1966); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1015 (R.I. 1982).
106. See, e.g., Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d at 914; Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 142; Glaskox, 614 So. 2d
at 912; Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820, 824 (Mont. 1983); Unah, 676 P.2d at 1370;
Briere, 224 A.2d at 590.
107. See. e.g., Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 142; Royle, 656 P.2d at 824; Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d at
914; Glaskox, 614 So. 2d at 912; Unah. 676 P.2d at 1370.
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ones. 08 In addition, these cases do not involve or threaten parental au-
thority. 0 9 Consequently, most of the courts recognizing an exception in
the case of motor vehicle accidents limit their holdings to those actions,
stating that when confronted with other cases involving parent-child
tort immunity, they will determine whether they should recognize or
abrogate the doctrine on different facts."10
For example, in the leading case of Sorensen v. Sorensen,"' a minor
child sued her father for injuries sustained in an automobile accident
caused by his negligence. " As the court explained,
We believe that the authorities which favor abrogation of the parental
immunity doctrine state the proper approach in light of modem
conditions and conceptions of public policy. Children enjoy the same
right to protection and to legal redress for wrongs done them as others
enjoy. Only the strongest reasons, grounded in public policy, can
justify limitation or abolition of those rights."3
The court further noted that the possibility of collusion in some cases
did not justify the arbitrary preclusion of meritorious claims brought by
injured minors." 4 Nonetheless, indicating that automobile accident
cases implicate neither parental authority and discipline nor parental
discretion in child care, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
like many other courts, limited the extent of its abrogation of parent-
child immunity to actions by unemancipated minor children against
their parents based on negligence arising out of motor vehicle acci-
dents."
(b) The Goller Approach: The Exercise of Reasonable Parental
Authority and Discretion
In Goller v. White," 6 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin abrogated
parent-child immunity in negligence cases, with two exceptions." 7 In
108. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d at 914-15; Briere, 224 A.2d at 590.
109. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d at 916.
110. See, e.g., Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 142; Royle, 656 P.2d at 824; Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610
P.2d 891, 893 (Wash. 1980). But see Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 640 (Me. 1979) (refusing to
limit abrogation to motor vehicle cases and to the extent of liability insurance coverage).
111. 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975).
112. Id. at 908.
113. Id. at 912.
114. Id. at 915.
115. Id. at 909, 916; see Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967); Transamerica Ins. Co.
v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1983).
116. 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
117. Id. at 198.
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Goller, a minor child, injured by a bolt protruding from a tractor,
brought suit against his foster father, alleging negligence in permitting
the child to ride the tractor and failing to warn him of the bolt." ' Fol-
lowing the reasoning of the courts that established the motor vehicle
exception, the Goiler court recognized the prevalence of liability insur-
ance in personal injury actions and its negation of the rationales under-
lying the immunity doctrine."19 Accordingly, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court decided to abrogate the doctrine except in two situations: "(1)
where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental author-
ity over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an
exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of
food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other
care."120
Courts in seven states have followed Wisconsin's lead, adopting the
Goier approach121 As in Goller, these courts articulated the general
scope of the abrogation and the exceptions, leaving it to the lower
courts to determine whether one of the exceptions applies in a particu-
lar case. 22 As explained by the Kentucky Supreme Court, "[a]n exercise
of parental authority simply involves acts of disciplining a child while
an exercise of discretion in providing for the care and necessities of a
child is limited to those provisions which a parent is legally obligated to
furnish."' 23 Nevertheless, while recognizing the general importance of
parental authority and discipline, other courts have rejected the Goller
approach and its implication "that within certain aspects of the parent-
child relationship, the parent has carte blanche to act negligently to-
ward his child." 24
(2) Nonnegligent Torts2 1
Courts in fifteen states have explicitly recognized exceptions to the
parent-child immunity doctrine for nonnegligent torts. 126 Indeed, the
118. Id. at 193.
119. Id. at 197.
120. Id. at 198.
121. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Sandoval v. Sandoval, 623 P.2d 800 (Ariz.
1981); Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970); Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979);
Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1983); Horn v. Horn, 630 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1982); Rigdon
v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970); Mayberry v. Pryor, 374 N.W.2d 683 (Mich. 1985); Plumley
v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1983).
122. See, e.g., Foldi, 461 A.2d at 1152.
123. Horn, 630 S.W.2d at 72.
124. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 652-53 (Cal. 1971); see also Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. 1980) ("application of the exceptions has proven to be very difficult be-
cause their precise scope is by no means clear").
125. "Nonnegligent" torts, at least for purposes of this Comment, include willful, wanton,
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modern trend is to allow unemancipated minor children to recover
damages against their parents for.injuries resulting from their parents'
willful or intentional misconduct. 127
For example, in Hurst v. Capitell,2 5 the Alabama Supreme Court
created an exception to the parent-child tort immunity doctrine. 29 In
Hurst, a minor daughter sued her stepfather and natural mother for
damages based on claims of alleged sexual abuse. 30 Refusing to apply
the immunity, the Hurst court reasoned: "To leave children who are
victims of such wrongful, intentional, heinous acts without a right to
redress those wrongs in a civil action is unconscionable, especially
where the harm to the family fabric has already occurred through that
abuse." 3' The court declined to establish a special set of rules to govern
sexual abuse cases, however, finding sufficient the traditional tort law
relating to intentional infliction of personal injuries.'32 Nonetheless, the
court did establish a higher standard of proof for these cases, requiring
that "proof of alleged sexually abusive conduct be tested under a 'clear
and convincing' standard, as opposed to a mere 'substantial evidence'
standard."' 33 In this way, the court explained, the limited exception still
preserves parents' right to discipline their children in a reasonable man-
ner. 13
malicious, and intentional torts. Unlike an intentional tort, "wanton or willful misconduct does not
require the establishment of a positive intent to injure." Foldi, 461 A.2d at 1154 (quoting Tabor v.
O'Grady, 161 A.2d 267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960)).
126. Alabama: Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1989); Arkansas: Attwood v. Estate of
Attwood, 633 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1982); California: Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955);
Colorado: Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 1385 (Colo. 1990); Georgia: Wright v. Wright, 70
S.E.2d 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952); Illinois: Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1956); Indiana:
Barnes v. Barnes, 603 N.E.2d 1337 (Ind. 1992); Maryland: Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923 (Md.
1951); North Carolina: Doe v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1992); Oklahoma: Wooden v. Hale, 426
P.2d 679, 680 (Okla. 1967) (court recognized in dicta that parent may be held liable for malicious
or criminal acts); Oregon: Cowgill v. Boock, 218 P.2d 445 (Or. 1950); Utah: Elkington v. Foust,
618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Washington: Jenkins v. Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 713
P.2d 79 (Wash. 1986); West Virginia: Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1991);
Wyoming: Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971). As previously mentioned, courts in some
states that have abrogated the doctrine for negligent torts may also allow actions based on nonne-
gligent torts, although those courts have not explicitly so stated. See supra notes 106-13 and accom-
panying text.
127. Doe v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 513 (N.C. 1992).
128. 539 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1989).
129. Id. at 266. The exception applies to natural parents, stepparents, and adoptive parents, as
"sexual abuse is not a respecter of parental status." Id. In Mitchell v. Davis, the Alabama Supreme
Court held that "foster parents may assert the defense of parental immunity against claims of
simple negligence brought by foster children in their care." 598 So. 2d 801, 804 (Ala. 1992).
130. Hurst, 539 So. 2d at 265.





Similarly, in Doe v. Holt,31 the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
cently refused to apply the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in a case
involving claims by minor children against their father for damages re-
sulting from sexual abuse. 136 As the Doe court reasoned,
It would be unconscionable if children who were injured by heinous
acts of their parents such as alleged here should have no avenue by
which to recover damages in redress of those wrongs. Where a parent
has injured his or her child through a willful and malicious act, any
concept of family harmony has been destroyed. Thus, the foremost
public purpose supporting the parent-child immunity doctrine is
absent, and there is no reason to extend the doctrine's protection to
such acts. 31
Therefore, recognizing that the public policy reasons justifying the ap-
plication of the immunity do not apply in situations of willful abuse,
the North Carolina Supreme Court, using the same reasoning as the
Alabama Supreme Court, established an exception to the doctrine for
these types of cases.l 
31
Courts in other states have also recognized exceptions to the immu-
nity in cases involving nonnegligent torts. For instance, Arkansas courts
have abrogated the immunity for intentional or willful injuries to chil-
dren by their parents, while leaving the doctrine in place for negligence
actions.3 9 Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court recently decided that
the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity does not preclude an action
predicated upon a claim of intentional felonious conduct in the absence
of parental privilege. 40 Maryland and Nebraska also have recognized
135. 418 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1992).
136. Id. at 514-15.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Carpenter v. Bishop, 720 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Ark. 1986). A parent or someone acting in the
place of a parent remains immune from suit for unintentional injuries to a child. Id. Regarding
intentional injuries, see Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 633 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1982) (father not
immune from suit after he intentionally drank too much, drove car at high speed, lost control, and
wrecked, causing injury to child); Brown v. Cole, 129 S.W.2d 245 (Ark. 1939) (adoptive father who
intentionally poisoned child not immune from suit). Regarding unintentional injuries, see Thomas
v. Inmon, 594 S.W.2d 853 (Ark. 1980) (persons acting in place of parents, for example, grandpar-
ents, immune from suit for unintentional torts); Rambo v. Rambo, 114 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Ark.
1938) (unemancipated minor cannot sue parent for unintentional tort: .'[I]t is deemed better public
policy that occasional injuries of this kind go unrequited rather than encourage or tolerate proceed-
ings so repugnant to natural sentiments concerning family relations."' (quoting Wick v. Wick, 212
N.W. 787, 787-88 (Wisc. 1927))).
140. Barnes v. Barnes, 603 N.E.2d 1337 (Ind. 1992) (immunity does not preclude action by
daughter against father for compensatory and punitive damages based on alleged assault and rape).
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an exception for actions by children against their parents "when the
parent's conduct is cruel and inhuman or wanton and malicious."' 4
Thus, courts in those states that recognize exceptions to the immunity
doctrine for nonnegligent torts attempt to protect the rights of the child
in egregious and abusive situations while preserving parents' authority
to discipline their children. Nonetheless, many of those courts continue
to prohibit or restrict the child's ability to sue the parent for negligent
torts.
c. No Immunity
Fifteen states and the District of Columbia have no immunity be-
tween parents and their children for tort actions. 4 1 Some jurisdictions
have abrogated the doctrine altogether, while others never adopted it.
(1) Doctrine Never Adopted
Courts in five states and the District of Columbia never adopted the
parent-child immunity doctrine. 4 3 Most of these courts reason that chil-
dren should have the same right to recover damages for their injuries as
other citizens. For instance, in Petersen v. City & County of Hono-
lulu,'"4 the Hawaii Supreme Court explicitly refused to recognize the
immunity, even in instances where no insurance coverage exists. 145 The
Petersen court began its analysis with the basic premise that "in gen-
eral, minor children are entitled to the same redress for wrongs done
them as are any other persons."' As the court explained, to deny chil-
dren this right, "a very substantial showing must be made that such
prohibition will help to achieve an important adverse policy. "147 When
141. Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826, 829 (Md. 1986) (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 403 A.2d
379 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979)); Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (Neb. 1959). The exception
also applies to persons standing in loco parentis. Novak, 99 N.W.2d at 25.
142. Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987); Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M.
1981).
143. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 416; Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw.
1969) (as amended in 1970); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974); Elkington v. Foust, 618
P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191 (Vt. 1977). Although a South Dakota court
has never considered the issue as it applies in that state, for purposes of this Comment, it is
grouped with the states that have never adopted the doctrine. See Kloppenburg v. Kloppenburg,
280 N.W. 206 (S.D. 1938) (South Dakota court applied Minnesota law); Brunner v. Hutchinson
Div., Lear-Siegler, 770 F. Supp. 517 (D.S.D. 1991) (federal court anticipated South Dakota would
not adopt doctrine).
144. 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw. 1969) (as amended in 1970).
145. Id. at 1008 ("parent-child negligence suits will be allowed in Hawaii regardless of the pres-
ence or absence of insurance coverage"); see also Tamashiro v. De Gama, 450 P.2d 998 (Haw.
1969) (minor child may be joined as joint tortfeasor in suit by parent against third party).
146. Petersen, 462 P.2d at 1009.
147. Id.
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parents commit wrongs against their children, however, "the harm to
the family relationship has already occurred" and "to prohibit repara-
tions can hardly aid in restoring harmony." Moreover, serious injus-
tice results when children are denied redress against their parents for
intentional torts as well as negligent ones. 149
Thus, these courts dismiss as no longer viable the various justifica-
tions often cited in support of the doctrine. As one court observed,
If the public policy reasons given for parental immunity are so
compelling, one would presume these seven states would have suffered
for failure to adopt the rule .... [T]here is no evidence or persuasive
material that any of these states ever suffered adverse consequences
for the lack of such a rule. 15
(2) Doctrine Completely Abrogated
Courts in ten states have completely abrogated parent-child tort im-
munity.'5 ' Six of these states have simply rejected the underlying justifi-
cations for the doctrine.1 12 In place of the doctrine, some jurisdictions
have adopted the view of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' Others
have elected to establish a special standard of care. 1 4
(a) Rejection of Underlying Justifications
Courts in six states that previously adhered to the parent-child immu-
nity doctrine have abrogated it completely, rejecting its underlying jus-
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388, 391 (Ohio 1985).
151. California: Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) (negligent torts); Emery v. Emery,
289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955) (nonnegligent torts); Minnesota: Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595
(Minn. 1980); Missouri: Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991); New Mexico: Guess v.
Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1981); New York: Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y.
1969); North Dakota: Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Ohio: Kirchner v. Crystal, 474
N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984); Oregon: Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984); Pennsylvania: Falco v.
Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971); South Carolina: Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980). See
Kathryn Calibey, Connecticut's Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 65 CosN. B.J. 210, 222 (1991);
Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826, 840-42 (Md. 1986).
152. New Mexico: Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1981); New York: Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969); North Dakota: Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D.
1967); Ohio: Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984); Pennsylvania: Falco v. Pados, 282
A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971); South Carolina: Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980).
153. Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984); Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987).
For a detailed discussion of the Restatement's view, see infra part IW.A. 1.c.(2)(b).
154. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn.
1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991); see also Comment, The "Reasonable
Parent" Standard: An Alternative to Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. CoLo. L. REv. 795, 804
(1976).
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tifications. For example, in Kirchner v. Crystal,5' the Ohio Supreme
Court abolished the doctrine, finding its rationales' 56 "outdated, highly
questionable and unpersuasive." 5 7 First, the court reasoned, "[if any
disruption to family harmony or tranquility occurs, it is more likely to
happen as a result of tortious conduct, rather than as a result of allow-
ing redress of the wrongful actions which led to injury.' 58 Second, the
possibility that some cases may involve parental authority and discre-
tion does not warrant continuation of the immunity. 5 9 The court also
acknowledged the prevalence of liability insurance and its ability to pre-
vent the depletion of the family's funds. 60 Finally, noting that the pos-
sibility of fraud and collusion exist in any legal action, the court saw no
reason to deny "an innocent injured child his or her day in court
merely because in some rare instances, fraud or collusion may take
place. ''161
Courts in other states have similarly abolished the doctrine. 12 Indeed,
as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained, the courts that have
abolished parent-child tort immunity recognize that the child's interest
in freedom from personal injury caused by the tortious conduct of oth-
ers outweighs any danger of fraud or collusion. 63
(b) Restatement View'6
Courts in two jurisdictions have adopted the view espoused by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 16 According to the Restatement, "[a]
parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by
reason of that relationship" and "[r]epudiation of general tort immu-
155. 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984).
156. The Kirchner court found other courts had upheld the doctrine based on only four of the
basic justifications: family harmony, parental discipline and control, family funds, and fraud and
collusion. Id. at 276. See Basic Justifications section supra part III.
157. Kirchner, 474 N.E.2d at 276.
158. Id. at 277. Similarly, in abrogating the doctrine, the New Mexico Supreme Court and the
South Carolina Supreme Court have explained that the conduct between the parties that gave rise
to the lawsuit causes the disharmony, not the lawsuit itself. Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869,
871 (N.M. 1981); Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109, 111 (S.C. 1980).
159. Kirchner, 474 N.E.2d at 277.
160. Id.;seealsoEam,268S.E.2dat 1I1.
161. Kirchner, 474 N.E.2d at 278; see also Elam, 268 S.E.2d at I11.
162. Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1981); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192
(N.Y. 1969); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa.
1971); Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980).
163. Falco, 282 A.2d at 355.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1993).
165. Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987); Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984).
The Rousey case is included in this section even though the District of Columbia never adopted the
doctrine. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 416.
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nity does not establish liability for an act or omission that, because of
the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not tor-
tious."'1 Thus, the Restatement rejects the parent-child tort immunity
doctrine, recognizing instead particular privileges arising out of the
unique character of the parent-child relationship.16 7
In Winn v. Gilroy,'6 the Oregon Supreme Court adopted the Re-
statement view, deciding "the proper inquiry concerns the tortious or
privileged nature of a parent's act that causes injury to the child, not a
special parental immunity from a child's action for personal torts as
distinct from other kinds of claims."' 69 As the Winn court explained,
the Restatement view reflected a concern "more with defining the re-
quired quality of parental conduct within the domestic setting than with
litigiousness, that is to say, with substantive standards of parental du-
ties and privileges more than with immunity from suit."' 70 Therefore,
the court concluded that, while a child may not recover damages from a
parent for injuries resulting from a privileged act on a parent's part, a
privilege would not apply to a parent acting in violation of the law. 17,
(c) Reasonable Parent Standard
Courts in three states have completely abrogated parent-child tort im-
munity and have adopted a special standard of care.' 72 In the landmark
decision of Gibson v. Gibson,7 1 the California Supreme Court rejected
the parent-child immunity doctrine and articulated the reasonable par-
ent standard. '7, The court noted that the traditional grounds for main-
taining the doctrine were no longer valid. First, when an insurance
company pays for the damages, the family harmony and family funds
rationales do not apply. 17 Second, the possibility of fraud and collusion
exists in all cases. 76 Finally, although some threat to parental authority
and discipline may exist, it does not warrant "continuation of a blanket
rule of immunity." 77
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1993).
167. Id.; see Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135, 139 (Kan. 1980).
168. 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984).
169. Id. at 784.
170. Id. at 783.
171. Id. at 785.
172. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn.
1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991).
173. 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971).
174. Id. at 652-53. In an earlier decision, the California Supreme Court held the immunity did
not preclude actions based on willful or malicious torts. Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955).
175. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 651.
176. Id. at 651-52.
177. Id. at 652.
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Instead, as the Gibson court explained, the pertinent inquiry to deter-
mine the parent's liability is: "[W]hat would an ordinarily reasonable
and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?' '1 78 Thus, the
parent's liability becomes a factual question for the jury to answer. Ab-
sent extraordinary circumstances, a child cannot sue a parent for bat-
tery if the parent spanks the child, and a child cannot sue for false
imprisonment if the parent sends the child to the child's room. 179 In
sum, within reasonable limits, parents can continue to invoke their pre-
rogative to exercise authority and impose discipline.180
Following California's lead, Minnesota also adopted the reasonable
parent standard in Anderson v. Stream. 8' Minnesota's experience
proves particularly illustrative as the court originally adopted the Goller
approach, abrogating the parental immunity doctrine except when the
alleged negligent act involved "reasonable parental authority" in an
area of "ordinary parental discretion. ' 182 After following Goller for
over a decade, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court found applica-
tion of the exceptions too difficult and arbitrary because of their un-
clear, ill-defined scope. 8 3 Consequently, the court reexamined its
position on parent-child tort immunity and decided to follow Gibson.'8
The court emphasized that "[ojur system of justice places great faith in
juries, and we see no compelling reason to distrust their effectiveness in
the parent-child context. '185 Thus, the court concluded that having a
jury apply the reasonable parent standard would adequately protect in-
herently parental functions.'8"
In sum, courts in some states have abrogated the doctrine for nonne-
gligent torts, 87 while others have abrogated the doctrine to allow chil-
dren to sue their parents for damages resulting from negligent torts.1 88
Because of mandatory insurance requirements, most of the states in this
section have abrogated the doctrine to enable children to sue their par-
ents for damages resulting from motor vehicle accidents. 18 9 Finally,
courts in those states with full immunity do not allow actions in any of
178. Id. at 653 (emphasis omitted).
179. Id. at 652.
180. Id. at 653.
181. 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
182. Silesky v. Kelman, 161 N.W.2d 631, 631 (Minn. 1968), overruled by Anderson v. Stream,
295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
183. Anderson, 295 N.W.2d at 598.
184. Id. at 598-601.
185. Id. at 600.
186. Id. at 599-600.
187. See Nonnegligent Torts section supra part IV.A.I.b.(2).
188. See Negligent Torts section supra part IV.A.l.b.(1).
189. See Motor Vehicle Accidents Exception section supra part IV.A.l.b.(1)(a).
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these situations, 19 while courts in those states with no immunity allow
suits in all of these situations.'
2. Florida
a. Ard v. Ard: Liability Insurance Exception
As courts in many other states have done, in Ard v. Ard, 92 the Su-
preme Court of Florida recognized an exception to the parent-child tort
immunity doctrine."'9 In Ard, a minor child sued his mother for dam-
ages caused when she negligently unloaded him from a motor vehicle.194
Reaffirming its adherence to the doctrine, the Florida Supreme Court
held that "in a tort action for negligence arising from an accident and
brought by an unemancipated minor child against a parent, the doc-
trine of parental immunity is waived to the extent of the parent's availa-
ble liability insurance coverage."1 95 If the parent does not have liability
insurance or if the policy contains an exclusion clause for household
and family members, then the parent-child immunity doctrine remains
applicable. 19 In rendering its decision, the Ard court considered and
rejected two of the major justifications supporting the immunity doc-
trine: (1) the family harmony argument and (2) the fraud and collusion
argument.
First, the court cited the Sorensen'9 case and the Massachusetts
court's discussion of the effect of insurance on the doctrine's justifica-
tions. 19 The Ard court reasoned that the presence of liability insurance
"cannot create a liability where none previously existed, but, rather,
forms the basis for the recognition of the change in conditions upon
which the public policy behind the immunity is based."' 19 Thus, like
other courts, the Ard court decided that, rather than creating liability,
insurance addresses the public policy concern for preventing depletion
190. See Full Immunity section supra part IV.A.l.a.; see also infra part lV.B.I.a.
191. See No Immunity section supra part IV.A.1.c.
192. 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982). For further discussion of the Florida Supreme Court's deci-
sion, see Charles A. Postler, Note, Torts-Parental Immunity-The Time For Change, 35 U. FLA.
L. REV. 181 (1983) and Atchison, supra note 9. For a discussion of the case as decided by the
district court, see Virginia B. Townes, Note, Torts-The First District Declines to Adopt the Doc-
trine of Parental Immunity-Ard v. Ard, 395 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981), 10 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 185 (1982).
193. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1067.
194. Id. at 1066.
195. Id. at 1067.
196. Id.
197. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975).
198. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1068-69 (citing Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d at 914).
199. Id. at 1068.
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of the family's finances. 20 Further, "rather than a source of dishar-
mony, the action is more likely to ease the financial difficulties stem-
ming from the injuries."'
Second, as courts in other states have done, the Ard court rejected
the fraud and collusion argument, reasoning that the possibility exists
in all litigation 12 The court believed that the possibility of fraud and
collusion did not warrant the denial of judicial relief.203 The court also
pointed out Florida's recognized policy of allowing a waiver of immu-
nity when liability insurance exists.2
Despite its apparent breakthrough in the Ard decision, the Florida
Supreme Court actually formulated a "hollow compromise" between
the competing needs of compensating injured children and preserving
family harmony.0 5 By limiting the scope of its decision to negligence
actions covered by liability insurance and otherwise affirming the doc-
trine, the court failed to protect minors from nonnegligent harm, such
as child abuse, inflicted on them by their parents. Additionally, because
liability insurance does not cover intentional torts, child victims of
abuse or incest cannot sue their abusive parents.2 Thus, in attempting
to preserve family harmony, the Ard court's decision has granted par-
ents too much discretion.
b. Richards v. Richards: Immunity for Intentional Torts
As in Tennessee,2 a Florida court recently refused to abrogate par-
ent-child immunity, reasoning that any further change in the doctrine
should come from the Legislature. In Richards v. Richards,°M a minor
child sued her father for damages resulting from alleged sexual as-
saults.2 In holding that parent-child immunity barred the action, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal explained that if the doctrine "is to be
abrogated to allow a child to bring an intentional tort action against a
parent, it should be done by statute." 210
The Richards court invoked two of the underlying justifications to
support application of the immunity. First, following the logic of the
200. Id. at 1068-69.
201. Id. at 1069.
202. Id. See Motor Vehicle Accidents Exception section supra part IV.A. 1.b.(l)(a).
203. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1069.
204. See id.
205. See Postler, supra note 192, at 187.
206. Mallory Gayle Holm, Barriers to Civil Recovery for Parental Incest in Florida: Too Much
Restfor the Wicked?, 65 FLA. B.J. 82, 82 (1991).
207. Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tenn. 1985).
208. 599 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA), review dismissed, 604 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1992).
209. Id. at 136.
210. Id. at 137.
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Ard decision, the Richards court reasoned that "[riecovery against a
parent by an individual child for an intentional tort, where insurance is
not available, decreases the assets available for the support of other
family members who may also be in need of assistance." ' 2' Thus, the
court relied on the family funds rationale to support its application of
the immunity doctrine to preclude the action.
Second, the court relied on the fraud and collusion rationale to jus-
tify application of the immunity, reasoning that "opening the doors to
tort actions for damages by children against parents would avail an un-
scrupulous parent of the opportunity to manipulate a minor child and
the legal system by bringing frivolous actions against the other par-
ent. "212 The court also indicated that if a parent abuses a child, the
parent is legally obligated to provide the child with the necessary treat-
ment, including medical and psychological care, and the child can en-
force this obligation.2 13
Finally, noting that the Legislature had abrogated interspousal im-
munity for battery without addressing parent-child immunity, the court
concluded that the Legislature is better suited to address the problem. 214
Thus, because the Florida Supreme Court did not hear the case, abused
children will continue to suffer, uncompensated for their injuries, until
the Florida Legislature takes action.
B. Legislative Action
1. General
Although most attempts to abrogate or modify the parent-child tort
immunity doctrine have come from the courts, legislative bodies in a
few states have passed statutes specifically addressing the doctrine. 25
a. Full Immunity
Louisiana is the only state that has adopted the parent-child tort im-
munity doctrine in statute form .16 The statute establishes immunity be-
tween unemancipated children and married or custodial parents." 7
Courts construing the statute have allowed children to sue their noncus-





215. Connecticut, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina. See infra Appendix accom-
panying note 299.
216. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:571 (West 1992). The Louisiana Legislature passed the statute in
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allowed children to bring an action against their father, who was judi-
cially separated from their mother, for damages arising out of a motor
vehicle accident.n -
b. Partial Immunity
As with judicial action, some states have enacted legislation abrogat-
ing the doctrine in the context of motor vehicle accidents, thereby per-
mitting children to sue their parents for damages to the extent of their
parents' liability insurance coverage.2 21 For example, the North Caro-
lina General Assembly passed a statute abolishing parent-child immu-
nity in motor vehicle cases: "The relationship of parent and child shall
not bar the right of action by a person or his estate against his parent or
child for wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising
out of operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated by the parent or
child." 22 The Connecticut Legislature has passed a similar statute. M
Thus, as in the context of judicial action, the legislatures of these states
have limited the scope of their abrogation of the doctrine to motor ve-
hicle accident cases.
c. No Immunity
No jurisdiction has specifically abolished the parent-child tort immu-
nity doctrine by statute.22 A North Dakota statute, however, provides
that everyone is responsible for his or her tortious acts. 25 Another
1960, which provides in full:
The child who is not emancipated cannot sue: (1) Either parent during the continuance
of their marriage, when the parents are not judicially separated; or (2) The parent who is
entitled to his custody and control, when the marriage of the parents is dissolved, or the
parents are judicially separated.
Id.
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 1980).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 706.
221. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572c (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1992). South Caro-
lina also statutorily abolished the immunity in motor vehicle accident cases, S.C. CoDa ANN. § 15-
5-210 (Law. Co-op. 1992); however, the South Carolina Supreme Court held this statute unconsti-
tutional, Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109, 110 (S.C. 1980).
222. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1992). The General Assembly originally abrogated the doc-
trine only as applied to suits by children against their parents. See N.C. GEN. STAY. § 1-539.21
(1975). In 1989, however, the General Assembly amended the statute to include actions by parents
against their children.
223. CONN. GEN. SrAT. ANN. § 52-572c (West 1992). The statute provides:
In all actions for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and in all actions accru-
ing on or after October 1, 1979, for negligence in the operation of an aircraft or vessel,
as defined in section 15-127, resulting in personal injury, wrongful death or injury to
property, the immunity between parent and child in such negligence action brought by a
parent against his child or by or on behalf of a child against his parent is abrogated.
Id.
224. See infra Appendix accompanying note 299.
225. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-06 (1992). The statute provides: "Everyone is responsible not
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North Dakota statute recognizes a civil cause of action for parental
abuse. Construing these statutes in Nuelle v. Wells,-1 the Supreme
Court of North Dakota refused to apply the doctrine of parent-child
tort immunityYm The court reasoned that because the legislature had
already unambiguously established the applicable law, the court did not
need to review decisions by other courts based on the common law.22 9
The court acknowledged that "the trend of the decisions in recent years
has been to depart very materially from the broad doctrine that an une-
mancipated minor cannot maintain a tort action against his parents."2 03
In conclusion, the court perceived "no overriding public policy consid-
erations which would permit . . . or require [the court] to set aside the
clear mandate of the law that applies in this case." 23'
2. Florida
Only recently has the Florida Legislature attempted to change the
state's law concerning parent-child tort immunity.232 During the 1993
Regular Session of the Florida Legislature, Representatives Shirley
Brown233 and Debbie Wasserman Schultz21 introduced almost identical
pieces of legislation aimed at abrogating the doctrine of parent-child
tort immunity with respect to actions founded on alleged child abuse
and incest. 35 On February 26, 1993, at a full committee meeting of the
only for the result of his willful acts but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person." Id.
226. Id. § 14-09-19. The statute provides:
The abuse of parental authority is the subject of judicial cognizance in a civil action in
the district court brought by the child, or by its relatives within the third degree, or by
the county social service board of the county where the child resides, and when the abuse
is established the child may be freed from the dominion of the parent and the duty of
support and education may be enforced.
Id.
227. 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967).
228. Id. at 366-67.
229. Id. at 366.
230. Id.
231. M. at 367.
232. During the 1992 Regular Session of the Florida Legislature, Senator Helen Gordon Davis,
Democrat, Tampa (1988-1992) and Representative Brian P. Rush, Democrat, Tampa, introduced
companion bills, Senate Bill 70 and House Bill 575, respectively, that would have established a civil
cause of action for damages resulting from intentional injuries to spouses and children. The bills
died in each chamber's Judiciary Committee. FLA. LEIS., FnrAL LEGisLArv BILL INFoMtAeION,




235. Representative Brown's bill, House Bill 621, proposed to abrogate the doctrine of parent-
child tort immunity for actions "founded on alleged abuse as defined in s. 39.01, Florida Statutes,
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House Judiciary Committee, the two bills were combined into a com-
mittee substitute, amended, and passed out of the committee. 236
The first section of the committee substitute made an important
statement regarding legislative intent: "It has never been the intent of
the Legislature to protect parents who willfully abuse their children.
' '13 7
This legislative intent section directly counteracts the Richards court's
inference that because the Legislature did not take action regarding par-
ent-child tort immunity when it abrogated interspousal immunity for
battery, the Legislature intended to preclude such actions between par-
ents and children. 238
The second section of the committee substitute contained the statu-
tory sections describing the actions for which the legislation would ab-
rogate the immunity doctrine. The committee substitute proposed to
abrogate the immunity doctrine for actions based on sexual battery239 or
aggravated child abusem "when such violation intentionally inflicts or
permits the infliction of physical or mental injury to the child and
causes great bodily harm, permanent disfigurement, or permanent disa-
bility."u The committee substitute also included in the abrogation all
s. 415.102, Florida Statutes, s. 827.03, Florida Statutes, or s. 827.04, Florida Statutes, incest as
defined in s. 826.04, Florida Statutes, or sexual battery as defined in s. 794.041, Florida Statutes
. .... Fla. HB 621, § 1 (1993).
Representative Schultz's bill, House Bill 1211, proposed to abrogate the doctrine for actions
"founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, Florida Statutes, or s. 415.102, Florida Statutes,
or incest as defined in s. 826.04, Florida Statutes" Fla. HB 1211, § 1 (1993). Representative Brown
introduced House Bill 621 on February 2, 1993, and the bill was referred to the House Judiciary
and Appropriations committees. FLA. H.R. JouR. 35 (Reg. Sess. Feb. 2, 1993). Representative
Schultz introduced House Bill 1211 on February 9, 1993, and her bill also was referred to the
Judiciary and Appropriations Committees. FLA. H.R. JouR. 102 (Reg. Sess. Feb. 9, 1993). Both
bills were referred further to the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Court Systems, Probate
and Consumer Law, and on February 19, 1993, the Subcommittee recommended combining the
two bills into a committee substitute. FLA. LEOIS., FNA. LEGIsLATIVE Bn INFORMATON, 1993 REo-
uI.AR SEssIoN, HISTORY OF HousE BILas at 65, HB 621; id. at 134, HB 1211.
236. FLA. H.R. Jous. 325 (Reg. Sess. March 3, 1993); FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEOisSATva BIL
INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HousE BaLs at 65, HB 621. The vote was 18
yeas to 2 nays. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, CS for HB 621 & 1211 (1993) Staff Analy-
sis I (final Mar. 2, 1993) (on file with comm.).
237. Fla. CS for HB 621 & 1211, § 1 (1993) (First Engrossed).
238. See Richards v. Richards, 599 So. 2d 135, 136 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA), review dismissed, 604
So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1992).
239. The committee substitute specified sexual battery as defined in section 794.011(l)(h), Flor-
ida Statutes. Fla. CS for HB 621 & 1211, at 1, lines 20-21 (1993). Section 794.011(1)(h) defines
"sexual battery" as "oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of
another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual battery
does not include any act done for a bona fide medical purpose." FLA. STAT. § 794.01 l(l)(h) (1991).
240. The committee substitute specified aggravated child abuse as defined in section 827.03(1),
Florida Statutes. Fla. CS for HB 621 & 1211, § 2 (1993). Section 827.03(1) defines "[a]ggravated
child abuse" as "one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) [commits aggravated battery
on a child; (b) [w]ilfully tortures a child; (c) [mialicously punishes a child; or (d) [w]illfully and
unlawfully cages a child." FLA. STAT. § 827.03(1) (1991).
241. Fla. CS for HB 621 & 1211, § 2 (1993).
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actions founded on child abuse,142 except those founded on deprivation
of medical treatment.
243
The third section of the committee substitute specifically excluded
"ordinary and reasonable parental discipline, including reasonable cor-
poral punishment" from the abrogation. 2" This section thus addressed
the concerns of many members of the House of Representatives that
children would be able to sue their parents if their parents gave them
spankings or otherwise "reasonably" punished them.
Finally, the committee substitute contained a few technical provi-
sions. The fourth section indicated that at any stage of the proceeding,
the court could appoint a guardian ad litem for the child.245 Although
this section may have been cumulative in light of a court's general au-
thority to appoint guardians ad litem, 24 it nevertheless clarified the in-
tent of the legislation and the court's role in securing representation for
children in these types of cases. The fifth section exempted the act from
the provisions of subsection 744.301(2), Florida Statutes.247 This section
of the committee substitute was included to prevent the parents of an
abused child from settling an action brought by the child against one of
the parents. The sixth section provided that in any action instituted un-
der the act, the court may award attorneys' fees to the prevailing plain-
tiff.2u Finally, the seventh section provided a severability clause, and
the eighth section provided that the act would take effect upon becom-
ing law. 249
242. The committee substitute specified any violation of section 827.04(i), Florida Statutes.
Fla. CS for H'B 621 & 1211, § 2, at 1 (1993). Section 827.04(1) defines the offense of child abuse as:
[w]hoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or allows a child to be
deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or who, knowingly
or by culpable negligence, inflicts or permits the infliction of physical or mental injury to
the child, and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent
disfigurement to such child shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
FLA. STAT. § 827.04(1) (1991).
243. Fli. CS for HB 621 & 1211, § 2 (1993).
244. Id. § 3, at 2.
245. Id. § 4.
246. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.210(b).
247. Fla. CS for HB.621 & 1211, § 5 (1993). Section 744.301(2) provides:
The natural guardian or guardians are authorized, on behalf of any of their minor chil-
dren, to settle and consummate a settlement of any claim or cause of action accruing to
any of their minor children for damages to the person or property of any of said minor
children and to collect, receive, manage, and dispose of the proceeds of any such settle-
ment and of any other real or personal property distributed from an estate or trust or
proceeds from a life insurance policy to, or otherwise accruing to the benefit of, the
child during minority, when the amount involved in anyinstance does not exceed $5,000,
without appointment, authority, or bond.
FLA. STAT. § 744.301(2) (1991).
248. Fla. CS for HB 621 & 1211, § 6 (1993).
249. Id. §§ 7-8.
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On March 18, 1993, the full House of Representatives debated the
committee substitute. 0 Representative Robert B. Sindler25' offered an
amendment to the bill which would have allowed the abrogated actions
only if the parent had been convicted of the specified crimes. 25 2 The
House did not pass this amendment. 25 3 lkepresentatives Schultz and
Brown then offered an amendment adding deprivation of necessary
food, clothing, and shelter to the list of actions excepted from the im-
munity abrogation for child abuse;2- this amendment passed 55 After
much debate, the full House of Representatives passed the bill, as
amended, by a relatively small margin. 2 6
Meanwhile, in the Florida Senate, Senator Jim Boczar 2l had intro-
duced Senate Bill 1344, a companion bill to House Bills 621 and
1211.151 Once the Committee Substitute for House Bills 621 and 1211
passed the House, however, the Senate Judiciary Committee received
and adopted the House version of the bill. 2 9 Nevertheless, on April 4,
the 1993 Legislative Session ended and the bill died without reaching
the Senate Floor ."
Although the bill failed to pass both houses, it represented a fairly
strong piece of legislation. With the rejection of the Sindler amend-
ment, the House members indicated an intent to allow a child to re-
cover damages from an abusive parent even when the parent has not
been convicted of the crime of child abuse. A majority of the members
thus rejected the view, adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court, estab-
lishing a higher standard of proof for these types of claims.26' To avoid
250. FLA. H.R. JouR. 493 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 18, 1993). The Florida Constitution specifies that
all bills must be read three times. FLA. CON s. art. III, § 7. The committee substitute was read the
first time on March 3, 1993. FLA. H.R. JouR. 323 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 3, 1993). On March 9, it was
placed on the special order calendar. FLA. LEGiS., FNA. LEGIsLATrvE Bin INToRMATION, 1993 REG-
Lu.AR SESSION, HISTORY OF Housa BILLS at 65, HB 621. On March 16, 1993, the bill was read a
second time. FLA. H.R. Jout. 451 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 16, 1993). On March 17, 1993, the bill was read
a third time, pending roll call. FLA. H.R. JouR. 474 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 17, 1993).
251. Dem., Apopka.
252. FLA. H.R. Joutr. 493 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 18, 1993).
253. Id.
254. Id. (amendment 3).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 493-94. The official vote was 67 yeas to 43 nays. Id.
257. Dem., Sarasota.
258. FLA. S. Jout. 139 (Reg. Sess. 1993). Senate Bill 1344 was introduced on February 17,
1993, and referred to the Senate Judiciary and Appropriations Committees. Id.
259. FLA. S. Jout. 423 (Reg. Sess. 1993).
260. FLA. LEGis., FINAL LEGISLATIvE BIL INFORMATION, 1993 REauLAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
SENATE Bras at 138, SB 1344.
261. See Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1989), discussed supra notes 128-34 and ac-
companying text.
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erroneous construction by a court, however, perhaps the bill should
have also included references to the definitions of "child abuse or
neglect" 2 and "sexual abuse of a child" 263 found in section 415.503,
Florida Statutes, in addition to the other statutory references.
Further, by including language exempting acts of ordinary, reasona-
ble parental discipline and corporal punishment, the committee substi-
tute in effect incorporated the reasonable parent standard advanced by
the California Supreme Court264 and adopted by other courts through-
out the United States.20 Finally, the provisions providing for the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem and an award of attorneys' fees
indicate an intent to guard against one parent manipulating a child into
bringing frivolous, meritless claims against the other parent. Therefore,
taken as a whole, had this piece of legislation passed, it would have
gone a long way toward remedying the problem posed by the parent-
child tort-immunity doctrine in child abuse and incest cases.
262. Section 415.503(3), Florida Statutes, defines "[cihild abuse or neglect" as "harm or
threatened harm to a child's physical or mental health or welfare by the acts or omissions of a
parent, adult household member, or other person responsible for the child's welfare, or, for pur-
poses of reporting requirements, by any person." FLA. STAT. § 415.503(3) (1991).
263. Section 415.503(16), Florida Statutes, defines "[s]exual abuse of a child" as one or more
of the following acts:
(a) Any penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anal opening of one person by the
penis of another person, whether or not there is the emission of semen.
(b) Any sexual contact between the genitals or anal opening of one person and the
mouth or tongue of another person.
(c) Any intrusion by one person into the genitals or anal opening of another person,
including the use of any object for this purpose, except that it does not include any act
intended for a valid medical purpose.
(d) The intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts, including the breasts, geni-
tal area, groin, inner thighs, and buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of either the
child or the perpetrator, except that it does not include:
1. Any act which may reasonably be construed to be a normal caretaker responsibility,
an interaction with, or affection for a child; or
2- Any act intended for a valid medical purpose.
(e) The intentional masturbation of the perpetrator's genitals in the presence of a child.
(f) The intentional exposure of the perpetrator's genitals in the presence of a child, or
any other sexual act intentionally perpetrated in the presence of a child, if such exposure
or sexual act is for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, aggression, degrada-
tion, or other similar purpose.
(g) The sexual exploitation of a child, which includes allowing, encouraging, or forcing a
child to:
1. Solicit for or engage in prostitution; or
2. Engage in a sexual performance, as defined by chapter 827.
FLA. STAr. § 415.503(16) (1991).
264. See Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971), discussed supra notes 173-80 and accom-
panying text.
265. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821
S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991).
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V. ABROGATION OF INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY: A STEPPING
STONE?
A. General
Parent-child tort immunity and interspousal tort immunity are often
discussed collectively as family immunities. 266 Indeed, despite the differ-
ences between the husband-wife relationship and the parent-child rela-
tionship, many courts rely heavily upon interspousal immunity to
justify the retention and application of parent-child immunity. 267 Simi-
larly, "[e]xpressing a close connection between the parental immunity
doctrine and the spousal immunity doctrine, [many] jurisdictions have
abolished one after abolishing the other. ' '2 Therefore, although the
common law has treated parents and children differently than husbands
and wives, "[analogy to spousal immunity is appropriate, however, in
the context of reevaluation of family harmony concerns.'"269
For example, the South Carolina Supreme Court used the abrogation
of interspousal tort immunity as part of its justification for abrogating
parent-child tort immunity. 70 Rejecting the family harmony rationale,
the court reasoned that "[ogic and justice are defied by permitting suit
by a wife and emancipated daughter, but not by an unemancipated son
when all are injured in the same accident through the negligence of the
husband-father.''271 The Vermont Supreme Court also referred to the
abrogation of interspousal immunity when it refused to recognize par-
ent-child immunity:
Since this state has historically allowed other kinds of suits between
266. See, e.g., James P. Kelaher, All in the Family Featuring Interspousal and Intrafamily Tort
Immunity-The Trend to Abolish in Florida, 55 FLA. B.J. 633, 633 (1981). Many differences exist
between interspousal and parent-child immunity:
(1) the husband-wife relationship is artificial and permanent (unless altered by the par-
ties);
(2) the relationship of parent and child is natural but for legal purposes of the doctrine
limited in duration to the minority of the child;
(3) the husband-wife relationship is created or entered into in a consensual manner,
while the parent-child situation is created by an act of God, inter alia; and
(4) there was no parent-child immunity established at common law.
Id. at 636.
267. See, e.g., Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 417 (D.C. 1987); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick,
611 P.2d 135, 137 (Kan. 1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991).
268. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 855.
269. Id.
270. Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980).
271. Id.at 1ll.
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parent and child ... and has recently set aside interspousal immunity
... a contrary ruling on the right to bring suit would be anomalous.
All of the policies relating to domestic tranquility, collusion and
fraud, intrafamily harmony and the like have all been seen as
insufficient to cut off the right to litigate a claim in these related
contexts, and should not do so here. 72
In addition, the Supreme Court of California justified its abrogation of
parent-child immunity by relying, in part, on its earlier abrogation of
interspousal immunity, noting that the family harmony and prevention
of fraud rationales no longer supported application of the doctrine.2 73
The California court concluded that "the threat to parental authority
and discipline, although of legitimate concern, cannot sustain a total
bar" to actions between parents and their children. 274 Finally, and most
succinctly, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that "[t]here is
no stronger public policy for barring intrafamily suits between parents
and children than existed for barring intraspousal suits. "275
Therefore, in abrogating the parent-child tort immunity doctrine,
many courts across the country have relied on their previous abrogation
of the interspousal tort immunity doctrine. As these courts have rea-
soned, many of the same rationales that no longer support application
of the immunity to suits between spouses likewise no longer support its
application to suits between parents and children.
B. Florida
As other courts across the country have done, the Florida Supreme
Court recently abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity in
Waite v. Waite.276 In Waite, a wife sued her husband for damages re-
sulting from injuries he inflicted on her with a machete. 277 The court
determined that "both public necessity and fundamental rights require
judicial abrogation of the doctrine." '278
In reaching this determination, the court made several points. First,
rejecting the "prevention of fraud and collusion" rationale, the court
asserted that married couples do not have an increased propensity to
272. Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191, 193 (Vt. 1977) (citations omitted).
273. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 651-52 (Cal. 1971).
274. Id. at 651.
275. Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869, 871 (N.M. 1981).
276. 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993). In Waite, the supreme court answered the following question
in the negative: "Does the doctrine of interspousal immunity remain a part of Florida's common
law?" Id. The Florida Legislature already had abrogated interspousal immunity in actions founded
on intentional battery. FLA. STAT. § 741.235 (1991).
277. Waite, 618 So. 2d at 1360.
278. Id. at 1361.
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engage in collusive and fraudulent conduct against insurance compa-
nies, and many devices are available to enable insurance companies to
detect deceptionY.2 9 Second, the court rejected the family harmony ra-
tionale, noting that because the actions forming the basis of the lawsuit
have already disrupted family harmony, allowing these types of lawsuits
will not foster "unwarranted marital discord." 2as Third, the court rec-
ognized that a majority of the states has abrogated the doctrine com-
pletely, "leaving Florida in a shrinking minority. '281
As evidenced by the preceding discussion and analysis, other states
have employed much the same reasoning in their abrogation of the par-
ent-child tort immunity doctrine. Therefore, in Florida, as in many
other states across the country, because the court has abrogated inter-
spousal immunity, "the analogy to interspousal rights now supports ab-
rogation of parent-child immunity." 22
VI. CONCLUSION: A REASONABLE RESPONSE
Having examined the history of the parent-child tort immunity doc-
trine, its underlying justifications, and its treatment by courts and legis-
latures across the country, Florida should abolish the doctrine. At the
very least, Florida should partially abrogate the doctrine to allow suits
by children against their parents for intentional torts, particularly child
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.; see Alabama: Penton v. Penton, 135 So. 481 (Ala. 1931); Alaska: Cramer v. Cramer,
379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Arkansas: Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957); California:
Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1962); Connecticut: Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889 (Conn. 1914);
Indiana: Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972); Iowa: Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616
(Iowa 1979); Kansas: Flagg v. Loy, 734 P.2d 1183 (Kan. 1987); Kentucky: Brown v. Gosser, 262
S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Maine: MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980); Michigan:
Hosko v. Hosko, 187 N.W.2d 236 (Mich. 1971); Minnesota: Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416
(Minn. 1969); Mississippi: Burns v. Burns, 518 So.2d 1205 (Miss. 1988); Montana: Noone v. Fink,
721 P.2d 1275 (Mont. 1986); Nebraska: Imig v. March, 279 N.W.2d 382 (Neb. 1979); New Hamp-
shire: Gilman v. Gilman, 95 A. 657 (N.H. 1915); New Jersey: Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951
(N.J. 1978); New Mexico: Maestas v. Overton, 531 P.2d 947 (N.M. 1975); New York: State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Westlake, 324 N.E.2d 137 (N.Y. 1974); North Carolina: Crowell v. Crowell,
105 S.E. 206 (N.C. 1920); North Dakota: Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 242 N.W. 526 (N.D. 1932);
Ohio: Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388 (Ohio 1985); Oklahoma: Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d
660 (Okla. 1938); Pennsylvania: Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859 (Pa. 1981); South Carolina: Pardue
v. Pardue, 166 S.E. 101 (S.C. 1932); South IJakota: Scotvold v. Scotvold, 298 N.W. 266 (S.D.
1941); Tennessee: Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tern. 1983); Texas: Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d
316 (Tex. 1987); Utah: Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980); Washington: Freehe v. Freehe,
500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972); West Virginia: Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va.
1978); Wisconsin: Wait v. Pierce, 209 N.W. 475 (Wis. 1926); Wyoming: Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d
1065 (Wyo. 1987).
282. Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787 (Iowa 1981). Perhaps of some significance, how-
ever, is that the Florida Supreme Court, in previous delineations of the policy reasons justifying
parent-child immunity, has omitted the analogy to interspousal immunity. See generally Ard v.
Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982).
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abuse and incest.2 13 If parents abuse anyone other than their minor chil-
dren, those victims can sue their abusers. 28 Similarly, if children are
abused by anyone other than their parents, they can sue their abusers.
If the victims happen to be the children of their abusers, however, the
victims are denied the opportunity to recover damages for their inju-
ries. 285
Furthermore, according to the Florida Constitution, "[t]he courts
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury. ' 26 In addition,
the Supreme Court of Florida has held that "[mlinors are natural per-
sons in the eyes of the law and '[c]onstitutional rights do not mature
and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, . . . possess constitutional
rights.' ' 187 In light of these rights, to allow children to sue their parents
in property and contract, while preventing such suits in tort, defies
logic, especially in cases of child abuse. 88
Additionally, if Florida adopted the reasonable parent standard,
courts and juries could continue to take into consideration the policies
supporting the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, particularly the
concern regarding parental authority. 2 9 As one court reasoned, explain-
ing the limitations on a parent's right to discipline a child,
Since the law imposes on the parent a duty to rear and discipline his
child and confers the right to prescribe a course of reasonable conduct
for its development, the parent has a wide discretion in the
performance of his parental functions, but that discretion does not
include the right wilfully to inflict personal injuries beyond the limits
of reasonable parental discipline.... While it may seem repugnant to
allow a minor to sue his parent, we think it more repugnant to leave a
minor child without redress for the damage he has suffered by reason
of his parent's wilful or malicious misconduct. A child, like every
other individual, has a right to freedom from such injury.3
Thus, adoption of the reasonable parent standard would balance the
rights of children to receive redress for their injuries against the rights
of parents to discipline their children.
283. Holm, supra note 206, at 82.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (emphasis added).
287. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
288. See, e.g., Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 418 (D.C. 1987). "An action to enforce prop-
erty or contract rights is surely no less adversarial than an action in tort, and in theory, at least, it
would present the same threat to family harmony." Id.; see also Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d
906, 911 (Miss. 1992); Postler, supra note 192, at 187.
289. See, e.g., Postler, supra note 192, at 188.
290. Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (Cal. 1955).
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Moreover, some commentators have advocated treating parent-child
immunity in a fashion similar to interspousal immunity.2 9' Indeed,
many courts that have abolished the interspousal immunity doctrine
have done the same with the parent-child immunity doctrine. These
courts reason that the public policy justifications that no longer support
application of interspousal immunity, particularly the preservation of
family funds292 and family harmony2 93 rationales, likewise no longer
support the application of parent-child immunity. Accordingly, the
Florida Supreme Court should completely abrogate the parent-child im-
munity doctrine as it recently did with the interspousal immunity doc-
trine.
Finally, the Florida Legislature should listen and respond to the cry
for help coming from the courts29 and the children. By passing legisla-
tion aimed at the abrogation of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine,
especially in instances of child abuse and incest, the Legislature would
enable children wronged by the intentional tortious acts of their parents
to recover for their injuries. In the absence of action by the Legislature,
the Florida courts should, as courts in other states have, 295 take it upon
themselves to remedy this problem.29 Indeed, "where a judicial crea-
tion has become outmoded or unjust in application, it is more often
appropriate for the judicial body to act to modify the law." 2 7 Regard-
291. See Young, supra note 17, at 640.
292. If parents abuse children other than their own, those children can sue their abusers and
this may reduce a family's assets. Holm, supra note 206, at 82. As one commentator has pointed
out,
[N]o court would deny recovery to a nonfamily plaintiff just because the defendant has a
family to support. The question is whether preserving the family is so important, and the
likelihood of preservation so great, that treating an abused family member differently
than a non-family victim is justified. In cases of [child abuse and] incest, it is not.
Id.
293. "Allowing civil immunity for a sexually abusive parent with assets, under the pretext of
maintaining family harmony, while the same conduct can send a criminal defendant to death row
borders on the ludicrous." Id.
294. "If the parent-child immunity doctrine is to be abrogated ... it should be done by stat-
ute." Richards v. Richards, 599 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA), review dismissed, 604 So. 2d 487
(Fla. 1992). At this point, only the Fifth District Court of Appeal has considered and rejected a
child's claim for damages caused by alleged abuse. Nevertheless, as incidents of abuse continue to
occur, more cases like Richards are certain to arise.
295. See supra parts IV.A. I .b.(2) and IV.A. 1 .c.(2).
296. The Montana Supreme Court stated: "The principle that an unemancipated minor may
not sue a parent in tort is a 'man-made rule,' and it is the duty of the judiciary in examining it to
make such rule as justice requires when the legislature has not chosen to act." Transamerica Ins.
Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820, 824 (Mont. 1983).
297. Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Lloyd v. Service Corp., 453
So. 2d 735, 740 (Ala. 1984)). The Hurst court noted that "[blecause the doctrine was judicially
created, it is not exclusively a legislative issue and it may be judicially qualified." Id. Moreover,
despite the court's previous decision to defer to the Legislature on the issue, "the Legislature has
1993] PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY 657
less of which branch takes action to abrogate the doctrine, just as Gre-
gory K. had a right to be heard in his action for termination of his
biological parents' rights,zst so too does an injured, abused child have a
right to be heard in his or her cry for help.
declined to act in regard to the doctrine, while the incidents of sexual abuse involving children have
continued to occur." Id. Consequently, the court created an exception to the doctrine for sexual
abuse cases. Id.
298. See Kriz, supra note 1, at 2008. The court held Gregory K. had "a constitutional right to
be heard in court, notwithstanding the rights of his parents and the state." Id. Although Gregory
K.'s action was for termination of parental rights, arguably such an action is more disruptive than
one for damages for injuries arising out of abuse.
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APPENDIX2'9
AUTHORITY
Partial Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala.
Immunity 1992) (immunity prohibits all civil suits
between children and parents); Hurst v.
Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1989) (sex-
ual abuse exception).
Partial Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967)









Sandoval v. Sandoval, 623 P.2d 800
(Ariz. 1981) (whether immunity applies
depends on actual cause of injury and
whether parent's act breached duty owed
to child within family sphere); Streenz v.
Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970) (motor
vehicle exception; cited Goller approach
with approval).
Carpenter v. Bishop, 720 S.W.2d 299
(Ark. 1986) (immunity for negligent
torts); Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 633
S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1982) (nonnegligent tort
exception).
No Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal.
Immunity 1971) (reasonable parent standard); Em-
ery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955).
Partial
Immunity
Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d
1385 (Colo. 1990) (nonnegligent tort ex-
ception); Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d 304
(Colo. 1974) (immunity for negligent
torts).
Partial CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572c (1993) (mo-
Immunity tor vehicle exception); Dubay v. Irish, 542
A.2d 711 (Conn. 1988) (immunity for







299. For ease of reference, this table arranges the states alphabetically. For the states within
each category, e.g., partial immunity, the reader should consult the appropriate section within the
body of this comment as well as the accompanying footnotes.
300. Asterisk indicates states that have abolished the interspousal immunity doctrine.
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Delaware Partial Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del.
Immunity 1979) (immunity when parental control,
authority, or discretion is involved, e.g.,
negligent supervision); Williams v. Wil-
liams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976) (motor
vdhicle exception).
District of No Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C.
Columbia Immunity 1987) (rejected immunity and adopted Re-
statement view).
Florida* Partial Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982)
Immunity (liability insurance exception); Orefice v.
Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970) (immu-
nity in tort actions between parents and
children).
Georgia Partial Coleman v. Coleman, 278 S.E.2d 114
Immunity (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Eschen v. Roney,
194 S.E.2d 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972);
Wright v. Wright, 70 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1952) (nonnegligent tort exception).
Hawaii No Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu,
Immunity 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw. 1969) (as amended
in 1970) (refused to recognize immunity).
Idaho Partial Farmers Ins. Group v. Reed, 712 P.2d
Immunity 550 (Idaho 1985) (immunity in situations
involving parental authority in child-rear-
ing); Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 P.2d 560
(Idaho 1980) (immunity for failure to su-
pervise).
Illinois Partial Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (Ill.
Immunity 1956) (nonnegligent tort exception); Cates
v. Cates, 588 N.E.2d 330 (I11. App. Ct.
1992) (motor vehicle exception), aff'd,
No. 73630, 1993 WL 323109 (I11. Aug. 26,
1993); Schenk v. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12
(Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (no immunity when
injury occurs outside family relationship).
Indiana* Partial Barnes v. Barnes, 603 N.E.2d 1337 (Ind.
Immunity 1992) (nonnegligent tort exception).
Iowa* Partial Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa
Immunity 1981) (negligent tort exception for injuries
caused outside area of parental authority
and discretion); Wagner v. Smith, 340
N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1983) (refused to ex-
tend abrogation to negligent supervision,
following Goller approach).
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Kansas* Partial Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135
Immunity (Kan. 1980) (motor vehicle exception).
Kentucky* Partial Horn v. Horn, 630 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1982);
Immunity Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky.
1970) (negligent tort exception, following
Goller approach).
Louisiana Full LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:571 (West 1992)
Immunity (full immunity for custodial parents).
Maine* Partial Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me.
Immunity 1979) (motor vehicle exception).
Maryland Partial Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826 (Md. 1986)
Immunity (immunity for negligent torts); Mahnke v.
Moore, 77 A.2d 923 (Md. 1951) (nonne-
gligent tort exception).
Massachusetts Partial Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 519 N.E.2d
Immunity 1299 (Mass. 1988) (negligent tort excep-
tion); Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526
(Mass. 1976) (motor vehicle exception).
Michigan* Partial Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich.
Immunity 1972) (negligent tort exception, following
Goller approach).
Minnesota* No Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595
Immunity (Minn. 1980) (completely abolished immu-
nity, adopting Gibson reasonable parent
standard); Silesky v. Kelman, 161 N.W.2d
631 (Minn. 1968) (partially abolished im-
munity, adopting Goller approach).
Mississippi* Partial Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906
Immunity (Miss. 1992) (motor vehicle exception).
Missouri No Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852
Immunity (Mo. 1991) (reasonable parent standard).
Montana* Partial Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d
Immunity 820 (Mont. 1983) (motor vehicle excep-
tion).
Nebraska* Partial Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16 (Neb.
Immunity 1959) (nonnegligent tort exception).
Nevada No Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev.
Immunity 1974) (refused to recognize immunity).
New No Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H.



















Foldi v. Jefferies, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J.
1983) (negligent tort exception, following
Goller approach; no immunity for nonne-
gligent supervision); France v. A.P.A.
Transp. Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970)
(motor vehicle exception).
Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869
(N.M. 1981).
Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338
(N.Y. 1974) (no immunity for failure to
supervise); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245
N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969).
Partial Doe v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1992)
Immunity (nonnegligent tort exception); Lee v.
Mowett Sales Co., 342 S.E.2d 882 (N.C.
1986) (immunity for negligent torts); N.C.
















Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D.
1967) (construing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-
10-06, 14-09-19 to allow suits between
parents and children).
Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio
1984).
Sixkiller v. Summers, 680 P.2d 360 (Okla.
1984) (immunity for negligent supervi-
sion); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366
(Okla. 1984) (motor vehicle exception);
Wooden v. Hale, 426 P.2d 679 (Okla.
1967) (court recognizes nonnegligent tort
exception in dicta).
Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984)
(Restatement view); Cowgill v. Boock,
218 P.2d 445 (Or. 1950) (abrogating pa-
rental immunity for tortious, but not priv-
ileged, parental acts that injure the child).
Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971).
Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982)
(motor vehicle exception).
Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980)
(statutory motor vehicle exception uncon-
stitutional; immunity abrogated com-
pletely).
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No Neither the judicial nor the legislative
Immunity branches have addressed the doctrine as it











Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221
(Tenn. 1985).
Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.
1988) (motor vehicle exception); Felder-
hoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex.
1971) (negligent tort exception, following
Goller approach).
Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah
1980) (refused to recognize immunity).
Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191 (Vt. 1977)
(refused to recognize immunity).
Wright v. Wright, 191 S.E.2d 223"'(Va.
1972) (immunity for negligent torts inci-
dent to parental relationship); Smith v.
Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971)
(motor vehicle exception).
Partial Jenkins v. Snohomish County Pub. Util.
Immunity Dist. No. 1, 713 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1986)
(nonnegligent tort exception; immunity
for negligent torts and failure to super-
vise); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610 P.2d 891
(Wash. 1980) (motor vehicle exception).
Partial Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418
Immunity (W. Va. 1991) (nonnegligent tort excep-
tion; immunity for reasonable corporal
punishment); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d
721 (W. Va. 1976) (motor vehicle excep-
tion).
Partial Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis.
Immunity 1963) (immunity abrogated for negligent
torts with two exceptions: exercise of rea-
sonable parental authority and exercise of
parental discretion regarding provision of
care and necessities).
Partial Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153
Immunity (Wyo. 1992) (motor vehicle exception;
court also indicates willingness to follow
Goller approach); Oldman v. Bartshe, 480
P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971) (nonnegligent tort
exception).
